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AUTONOMOUS CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
Carla L. Reyes*
Abstract: Several states have recently changed their business organization law to
accommodate autonomous businesses—businesses operated entirely through computer code.
A variety of international civil society groups are also actively developing new frameworks—
and a model law—for enabling decentralized, autonomous businesses to achieve a corporate
or corporate-like status that bestows legal personhood. Meanwhile, various jurisdictions,
including the European Union, have considered whether and to what extent artificial
intelligence (AI) more broadly should be endowed with personhood to respond to AI’s
increasing presence in society. Despite the fairly obvious overlap between the two sets of
inquiries, the legal and policy discussions between the two only rarely overlap. As a result of
this failure to communicate, both areas of personhood theory fail to account for the important
role that socio-technical and socio-legal context plays in law and policy development. This
Article fills the gap by investigating the limits of artificial rights at the intersection of
corporations and artificial intelligence. Specifically, this Article argues that building a
comprehensive legal approach to artificial rights—rights enjoyed by artificial people, whether
corporate entity, machine, or otherwise—requires approaching the issue through a systems lens
to ensure that the legal system adequately considers the varied socio-technical contexts in
which artificial people exist.
To make these claims, this Article begins by establishing a terminology baseline, and
emphasizing the importance of viewing AI as part of a socio-technical system. Part I then
concludes by reviewing the existing ecosystem of autonomous corporations. Parts II and III
then examine the existing debates around artificially intelligent persons and corporate
personhood, arguing that the socio-legal needs driving artificial personhood debates in both
contexts include: protecting the rights of natural people, upholding social values, and creating
a fiction for legal convenience. Parts II and III also explore the extent to which the theories
from either set of literature fits the reality of autonomous businesses, illuminating gaps and
using them to demonstrate that the law must consider the socio-technical context of AI systems
and the socio-legal complexity of corporations to decide how autonomous businesses will
interact with the world. Ultimately, the Article identifies and leverages links between both
areas of legal personhood to demonstrate the Article’s core claim: developing law for artificial
systems in any context should use the systems nature of the technical artifact to tie its legal
treatment directly to the system’s socio-technical reality.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1986, Meir Dan-Cohen offered a fictional story of entrepreneur
Rupert Personless to illustrate the boundaries of corporate personhood.1
In the story, Rupert Personless, together with several partners,
incorporated Personless Corporation to manufacture small widgets.2 As
the company grew, it hired employees and operated a number of factories,
eventually going public.3 Over time, the number of shareholders climbed,
1. MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL THEORY FOR
BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 46–51 (1986).
2. Id. at 46.
3. Id.
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Rupert Personless and the other original founders retired, and a
professional management team effectively controlled the company.4 At
some point, Personless Corporation bought-back all of its outstanding
stock, fired all its employees, and transferred all management powers to
computers, such that Personless Corporation lived up to its name: a fully
automated, ownerless corporation operating without a single person.5
Dan-Cohen argued that the transition from human managed to computer
managed corporation changed little in terms of Personless Corporation’s
status under the law.6 Regardless of who or what managed the corporation,
Personless Corporation enjoyed the right to enforce contract and property
rights, and held a duty to perform its contractual obligations.7 Throughout
its life—both when managed by humans and when fully automated—
Personless Corporation supported political candidates with positions
favorable to its business and donated to local charities, activities generally
associated with human actors.8 The story of Personless Corporation’s
transition into a corporate “intelligent machine”9 shines a light on the fact
that the organizational realities of a corporation resemble very few
characteristics of persons.10 The story of Personless Corporation thus
serves, and has served for more than three decades, as an analytical tool
that demonstrates the pain points in the doctrine of corporate
personhood.11 If a corporation with no people receives the same legal
treatment as a closely held corporation operated by people at every level,
does the fiction of corporate personhood need to be revisited?
In another area of law, similar to the questions generated by the
Personless Corporation hypothetical, scholars and law-makers consider
whether and under what circumstances a robot or other artificial

4. Id.
5. Id. at 47.
6. Id. (“[Personless Corporation] had become not only an ownerless corporation, but also a fully
automated corporation. This fact, again, had little effect on the manufacture of small widgets, nor did
it alter the legal status of Personless in any important way.” (internal citation omitted)).
7. Id. at 47–48.
8. Id. at 46–48.
9. Id. at 49 (“The intelligent machine, into which Personless corporation has thus evolved, may
therefore be a cogent way to think about corporations and other organizations.”).
10. Id. at 50 (“[The metaphor of the intelligent machine] is thus not meant to relieve us from
confronting the reality of the organization. Quite the contrary: it is, indeed, one of the merits of the
intelligent machine metaphor that it forces us to such a confrontation, since, unlike the metaphor of
person, it does not allow us to ignore the reality of the organization by simply assimilating it to a
prevailing individualistic framework.”).
11. Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629, 1670–71
[hereinafter Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood].
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intelligence (AI) should be treated as a person.12 For many in the AI arena,
finding a way to make AI liable when things go wrong represents the
central and most important inquiry.13 However, conferring personhood to
make AI a subject of law also endows AI with agency under the law.14
Such agency, in turn, raises the question of whether the law should
recognize rights alongside liability.15 When would recognizing such rights
be appropriate, and under what policy rationale? Generalized slightly,
scholars in both arenas—AI personhood and corporate personhood—
grapple with several core doctrinal questions: when should the law
recognize artificial systems16 as artificial people, and once it has done so,

12. See generally Kate Darling, Extending Legal Protection to Social Robots: The Effects of
Anthropomorphism, Empathy, and Violent Behavior Towards Robotic Objects, in ROBOT LAW 213
(Ryan Calo, A. Michael Froomkin & Ian Kerr eds., 2016) [hereinafter Legal Protection for Social
Robots] (arguing that the law should treat robots more like animals in certain contexts where humans
anthropomorphize robots as a tool for discouraging certain bad human behavior); Kate Darling,
“Who’s Johnny?” Anthropomorphic Framing in Human-Robot Interaction, Integration, and Policy,
in ROBOT ETHICS 2.0: FROM AUTONOMOUS CARS TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 173 (Patrick Lin,
Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins eds., 2017) (exploring the role of anthropomorphic framing on humanmachine interaction); SVEN NYHOLM, HUMANS AND ROBOTS: ETHICS, AGENCY, AND
ANTHROPOMORPHISM (2020) (exploring agency as a lens for evaluating ethical and responsible
human-machine interaction).
13. See generally Iria Giuffrida, Liability for AI Decision-Making: Some Legal and Ethical
Considerations, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 439 (2019) (considering the liability risks from use of AI
systems and proposing a framework for policy and ethical decision-making around holding AI and its
creators accountable); Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.: Personhood for Autonomous Systems?, 88
FORDHAM L. REV. 591 (2019) (weighing arguments for making AI directly liable against arguments
for imposing strict product liability on manufacturers and fault liability on users); Mark A. Lemley &
Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (2019) (theorizing a law of remedies for
robots).
14. Here, the word agency is used for its dictionary meaning, rather than as a legal concept or
doctrine referring to a principle-agent relationship. When regulators seek to give AI systems legal
personhood to hold them liable for harmful acts, a key legal principle applies—namely, “[p]erhaps
the most basic concept in legal liability in general and tort liability, in particular, is that the law
governs the behavior of people and liability could only be attributed to a person demonstrating the
capability to act as a purposive agent.” Omri Rachum-Twaig, Whose Robot Is It Anyway?: Liability
for Artificial-Intelligence-Based Robots, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. 1141, 1150.
15. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Siri-ously? Free Speech Rights and Artificial
Intelligence, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1169, 1175 (2016) (asking whether the First Amendment should
cover the speech of AI speakers). See generally Shlomit Yanisky-Ravid, Generating Rembrandt:
Artificial Intelligence, Copyright, and Accountability in the 3A Era—The Human-Like Authors Are
Already Here—A New Model, 2017 MICH. ST. L. REV. 659 (considering when and whether AI authors
should receive rights under copyright law in addition to liability for their violations).
16. The term “system” is defined differently across many disciplines, yet, as one scholar notes:
“[T]hese definitions share several common, persistent elements: A system has an objective or goal
(in other words, it has defined Work to be accomplished). A system contains multiple components (or
Resources). A system’s components work together, each performing defined functions, to enable the
objective or goal to be achieved.” JEFFREY RITTER, ACHIEVING DIGITAL TRUST: THE NEW RULES
FOR BUSINESS AT THE SPEED OF LIGHT 133 (2015) (emphasis in original). A separate component of
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how should the law draw limits around the scope of artificial rights?
Although scholars agree that under the current corporate personhood
doctrine, corporations can possess constitutional rights,17 identifying
which rights and the scope of those rights remain the subject of much
debate.18 This debate often downplays the Personless Corporation story as
implausible19 and therefore of limited use in crafting a principled
approach to limiting artificial rights in the corporate context. However,
emerging technology, such as blockchain technology and machine
learning, enables nearly real-life versions of the Personless Corporation,
bringing the pain points that autonomous corporations inject into the
doctrine of corporate personhood center stage.20 Scholarly treatment of
such autonomous business enterprises to date focuses on whether and how

systems includes the rules that govern the system’s behavior. Id. at 145. When I argue that the law
must look at artificial systems and consider their socio-technical and socio-legal aspects, I draw upon
this idea of systems as including the rules that govern them—including technological rules, legal
rules, and rules of social interaction (like ethics and other concepts that might be called “soft law”).
17. See, e.g., Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1670 (“[T]he
corporate personhood doctrine stands for little more than the mere recognition that corporations can
hold rights.”); Elizabeth Pollman, A Corporate Right to Privacy, 99 MINN. L. REV. 27, 32 (2014)
[hereinafter Pollman, Corporate Privacy] (explaining that the Supreme Court has “often relied on a
view of the corporation as an association in extending rights to corporations on a derivative basis”);
Kent Greenfield, In Defense of Corporate Persons, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 309, 316 (2015) (“But one
piece of analysis is indeed easy: the argument that corporations should not have standing to assert any
constitutional right is quite weak indeed.” (emphasis in original)).
18. See, e.g., Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1659–63 (arguing
that a disconnect exists between the modern Supreme Court’s corporate personhood decisions and the
three personhood theories); Pollman, Corporate Privacy, supra note 17, at 30–32 (arguing that “most
corporations in most circumstances should not have a constitutional right to privacy” and outlining
initial reasons in support); Margaret M. Blair & Elizabeth Pollman, The Derivative Nature of
Corporate Constitutional Rights, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2015) (“[T]he Court’s
characterization of corporations as associations has not properly evolved to account for the wide
spectrum of organizations labeled ‘corporations.’ This has become increasingly problematic as the
Court has moved from early case law concerning the property and contract rights of corporations to
the realm of corporate speech, political spending, and the exercise of religion.”); Carliss N. Chatman,
The Corporate Personhood Two-Step, 18 NEV. L.J. 811, 813 (2018) (explaining that “Courts have
accepted the rights of corporations as a foregone conclusion based in part on a flawed understanding
of corporate formation and governance” and arguing for an approach that honors state law and choices
of business founders at formation); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Personhood and Corporate Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 260, 260 (D.
Gordon Smith & Andrew S. Gold eds., 2018) (explaining that “the notion of corporate personhood is
unendingly controversial”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David K. Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby
Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2015) (discussing the debate in the Hobby Lobby case as to whether or
not a corporation can exercise religion).
19. Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1670 (“[T]he intelligent
machine metaphor seems implausible because it contemplates a corporation without human
involvement . . . .”).
20. For a deeper discussion of such entities and how they operate, see Carla L. Reyes, Autonomous
Business Reality, 21 NEV. L.J. 437 (2021) [hereinafter Reyes, ABR].
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such businesses may achieve recognition as a legal entity.21 In concluding
that autonomous businesses can achieve the status of a legal entity,
including via the corporate form, the current literature hints at the need to
revisit the question of how the Personless Corporation impacts corporate
personhood, but generally reserves that topic for further investigation.22
This Article picks up that line of investigation and argues that an adequate
approach to autonomous corporate personhood requires looking beyond
traditional corporate rights doctrine to artificial personhood more broadly.
The literature investigating when and whether to confer legal
personhood on AI, however, focuses largely on one of two issues, neither
of which reflect industry reality. On the one hand, a significant segment
of artificial personhood scholarship advocates for determining a legal
regime for AI before developers build functioning general AI,23 a type of
AI which, if it existed, would exhibit true consciousness.24 Those that
focus on the industry state of the art (narrow AI),25 on the other hand, extol
the virtues of caution in this arena—noting a strong concern that even
narrow AI acts without human intervention, unpredictably, and

21. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Algorithmic Entities, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 887 (2018) (suggesting
methods for creating an algorithmic limited liability corporation, limited partnership, and corporation
under existing law); Shawn Bayern, The Implications of Modern Business-Entity Law for the
Regulation of Autonomous Systems, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 93, 94–96 (2015) [hereinafter Bayern,
Autonomous Systems] (demonstrating a technique for creating an algorithmically operated limited
liability company); Carla L. Reyes, If Rockefeller Were a Coder, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 373 (2019)
[hereinafter Reyes, Rockefeller] (suggesting the use of a business trust as a formal business structure
for certain blockchain protocols, decentralized organizations, and smart contracts).
22. Shawn Bayern, Of Bitcoins, Independently Wealthy Software, and the Zero Member LLC, 108
NW. U. L. REV. 1485, 1487 (2014) [hereinafter Bayern, Of Bitcoins]; Bayern, Autonomous Systems,
supra note 21, at 95; Shawn Bayern, Thomas Burri, Thomas D. Grant, Daniel M. Häusermann, Florian
Möslein & Richard Williams, Company Law and Autonomous Systems: A Blueprint for Lawyers,
Entrepreneurs, and Regulators, 9 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 135, 138 (2017); Reyes, Rockefeller,
supra note 21, at 378 n.24; Matthew U. Scherer, Of Wild Beasts and Digital Analogues: The Legal
Status of Autonomous Systems, 19 NEV. L.J. 259, 261–65 (2018); Shawn Bayern, Are Autonomous
Entities Possible?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 23, 26 (2019).
23. See, e.g., Massaro & Norton, supra note 15, at 1172–75 (concluding strong AI could generate
speech worthy of First Amendment protection); Toni M. Massaro, Helen Norton & Margot E.
Kaminiski, Siri-ously 2.0: What Artificial Intelligence Reveals About the First Amendment, 101
MINN. L. REV. 2481, 2483 (2017) (building on the claim that strong AI speech would qualify for First
Amendment protection); Evan J. Zimmerman, Machine Minds: Frontiers in Legal Personhood 41
(Aug. 28, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=256
3965 [https://perma.cc/ENL8-2QW7] (arguing that strong AI should receive legal personhood).
24. Brian L. Frye, The Lion, the Bat & the Thermostat: Metaphors on Consciousness, 5 SAVANNAH
L. REV. 13, 19 (2018).
25. Harry Surden, Artificial Intelligence and Law: An Overview, 35 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1305, 1309
(2019) [hereinafter Surden, AI Overview] (“Instead, today’s AI systems excel in narrow, limited
settings, like chess, that have particular characteristics—often where there are clear right or wrong
answers, where there are discernible underlying patterns and structures, and where fast search and
computation provides advantages over human cognition.”).
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opaquely.26 However, each of these approaches ignores the extremely
varied socio-technical contexts of AI use cases and fails to consider how
socio-technical differences in AI systems may impact the legal analysis.
This reflects a significant gap in the literature because developing
appropriate legal rules increasingly requires considering the sociotechnical context in which the technology is used.27 Doing so is difficult,
however, when generalizing about either general AI or narrow AI. As a
result, this Article uses the application of AI in one social context—
autonomous businesses—as an opportunity to demonstrate a systems
approach to answering questions about the nature and scope of legal
personhood for artificial systems.
This Article demonstrates the importance of considering the sociotechnical context when developing law for artificial systems by
investigating the limits of artificial rights at the intersection of
corporations and AI. Indeed, the increasingly automated nature of
corporate operations and management offers a vehicle through which to
advance the discussion of corporate rights, and, inversely, the long history
of granting artificial rights to corporations holds lessons for outlining the
contours of artificial rights in the AI context. Specifically, this Article
argues that building a comprehensive legal approach to artificial rights
(rights enjoyed by artificial people, whether entity, machine, or
otherwise), requires approaching the issue through a systems lens. Doing
so demands a higher level of interdisciplinarity than what typically
dominates siloed areas of legal theory like corporate law.28 A systems
approach allows the law to take account of the varied socio-technical
contexts in which these systems arise using a reasoned and predictable
approach.
To make these claims, Part I begins by establishing terminology and
emphasizes the importance of viewing AI as part of a socio-technical
system. Part I then reviews the varied nature of existing autonomous
entities. Parts II and III examine the existing debates around both
artificially intelligent persons and corporate personhood. In particular, the
Article argues that the socio-legal needs driving artificial personhood
debates in both contexts include protecting the rights of individual people,
upholding social values, and creating a fiction for legal convenience.
26. Nadia Banteka, Artificially Intelligent Persons, 58 HOUS. L. REV. 537, 547 (2021) (“Deep
machine learning algorithms are challenging for the law for three related reasons: they are
unpredictable, they are opaque, and they are increasingly autonomous.”).
27. Madeline Clare Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction,
5 ENGAGING SCI., TECH. & SOC’Y 40, 50–52 (2019).
28. For a discussion of the silos in corporate law, see Carliss N. Chatman, Myth of the Attorney
Whistleblower, 72 SMU L. REV. 669, 676–86 (2019).
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Parts II and III explore the extent to which the theories from either set of
literature fits the reality of autonomous business. The resulting gap
analysis demonstrates that the literature’s discussion of autonomous
corporate personhood leaves out several types of autonomous businesses
because the law tends to think of autonomous businesses as just one thing
or another. Ultimately, the Article uses these gaps to argue that the law
must consider socio-legal and socio-technical context to decide the legal
terms under which an autonomous business should interact with the
world. Part IV identifies links between theories of legal personhood that
drive both the artificial intelligence and corporate debates. Part IV then
uses those linkages to identify core lessons for approaching questions of
artificial personhood moving forward. The Article concludes by
considering the implication of its core argument: the need for a
fundamentally different approach to developing law related to artificial
systems in any context—one that uses the systems nature of the technical
artifact29 to tie its legal treatment directly to the system’s socio-technical
and socio-legal reality.
I.

ARTIFICIAL PERSONHOOD AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
SOCIO-TECHNICAL CONTEXT

The concept of personhood for artificial entities is not new. Rather, a
diverse set of stakeholders asking a diverse set of policy questions have
explored the frontiers of artificial personhood in a variety of contexts for
decades.30 Fascinatingly, these divergent explorations rarely engage each
other.31 To help bridge this gap, this Part argues that any approach to
29. The term artifact refers to “a discrete material object, consciously produced or transformed by
human activity, under the influence of the physical and/or cultural environment.” Mark C. Suchman,
The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 98 (2003); see also Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
The Persistence of “Dumb” Contracts, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2019) (applying
Suchman’s definition to blockchain-based smart contracts). “A technical artifact is one, like a tool or
a machine, that serves a utilitarian, productive purpose.” Lipshaw, supra, at 8–9 (citing Suchman,
supra, at 99–100).
30. See, e.g., Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal Rights for
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972) (advocating for endowing “forests, oceans, rivers
and other so-called ‘natural-objects’ in the environment” with legal rights); Lawrence B. Solum,
Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1231 (1992) (considering the potential
grounds for recognizing AI as a legal person); SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL
THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011) (exploring the implications of personhood
for artificial agents for agency, contract law, tort liability, and regulations that rely upon a knowledge
standard); S.M. Solaiman, Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, Idols and Chimpanzees: A
Quest for Legitimacy, 25 A.I. & L. 155, 165 (2017) (arguing that in the context of industrial robots
with some degree of self-control, it is inappropriate to recognize legal personhood for robots).
31. For the rare exploration of both corporate personhood and legal personhood for artificial
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deciding when to recognize artificial rights and how to limit such rights
must begin by viewing the technical artifact in question as a system even
before the law awards it “personhood.” To do so, this Part first defines
several key terms and emphasizes the importance of the socio-technical
context when building legal rules for AI.32 Taking up autonomous
business as one particular socio-technical context for exploring legal
personhood, this Part concludes by demonstrating the varied nature of
existing autonomous corporations.
A.

Preliminary Matters: Defining Key Terms and Level-Setting on
Key Paradigms

Although level-setting technology terms always represents a
worthwhile endeavor, doing so in the realm of artificial intelligence (AI)
is always difficult, given the lack of a generally agreed upon definition.33
In the most general sense, however, AI refers to “a human-made machine
that can replicate a cognitive function of a human.”34 Many computational
intelligence, see, for example, Banteka, supra note 26, which empirically reviews cases involving
legal personhood, including corporate personhood, and concludes the courts’ approach does not
support legal personhood for AI entities and argues that legislators should exercise extreme caution
before extending personhood to AI entities. See also Joanna J. Bryson, Mihailis E. Diamantis &
Thomas D. Grant, Of, For, and By the People: The Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons, 25 A.I. & L.
273, 279 (2017) (using legal and philosophical frameworks to evaluate legal personhood for other
non-human entities, including corporations, to conclude that “the case for electronic personhood is
weak”); Wagner, supra note 13 (drawing lessons for corporate legal personhood to explore AI liability
under tort law); Thomas Burri, Free Movement of Algorithms: Artificially Intelligent Persons
Conquer the European Union’s Internal Market, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 537 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018).
32. Carla L. Reyes & Jeff Ward, Digging into Algorithms: Legal Ethics and Legal Access, 21 NEV.
L.J. 325, 344 (2020).
33. Surden, AI Overview, supra note 25, at 1307 (“What is AI? There are many ways to answer this
question . . . .”); Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 51 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 399, 403 (2017) [hereinafter Calo, AI Policy]; Matthew U. Scherer, Regulating Artificial
Intelligence Systems: Risks, Challenges, Competencies, and Strategies, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 353,
359 (2016) (“Unfortunately, there does not yet appear to be any widely accepted definition of artificial
intelligence even among experts in the field, much less a useful working definition for the purposes
of regulation.”); Giuffrida, supra note 13, at 441 (“Yet, no generally accepted definition [of AI]
exists.”); Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, You Might Be a Robot, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 287, 293
(2020) (“The overlap between people, algorithms, computers, robots, and ordinary machines is
sufficiently great that there is no good legal definition of a robot.”).
34. Frye, supra note 24, at 17; Surden, AI Overview, supra note 25, at 1307 (“[O]ne place to begin
is to consider the types of problems that AI technology is often used to address. In that spirit, we
might describe AI as using technology to automate tasks that ‘normally require human
intelligence.’”); Milan Markovic, Rise of the Robot Lawyers?, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 325, 329 (2019)
(“Although definitions of artificial intelligence vary, the term is generally associated with the
automation of intelligent behavior via computer processes.”); Calo, AI Policy, supra note 33, at 404
(defining AI as “a set of techniques aimed at approximating some aspect of human or animal cognition
using machines”).
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techniques can seek to replicate the cognitive function of a human, and,
as a result, many consider AI to refer to a large set of information or
computer sciences.35 The most often discussed disciplines of AI, although
others exist,36 include data mining,37 expert systems,38 machine learning,39
neural networks,40 and robotics.41 Data mining refers to the automated
discovery of statistical relationships among data.42 Together, the
discovered statistical relationships form a model, which can be used to
make predictions or classifications.43 Expert systems, also sometimes
referred to as hand-crafted algorithms, are designed with the assistance of
human subject-matter experts, who help build the (often) if-then rules that
allow the expert system to mimic the type of reasoning the human subjectmatter experts would have undertaken themselves.44 Notably, significant
variance exists in the computational methods used to build expert
systems.45
35. M. TIM JONES, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A SYSTEMS APPROACH 5 (2008); Surden, AI
Overview, supra note 25, at 1310.
36. Some of these other disciplines include natural language processing, natural language
understanding, planning, and evolutionary computation. JONES, supra note 35, at 15–17.
37. JIAWEI HAN, MICHELINE KAMBER & JIAN PEI, DATA MINING: CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES, at
xxiii (3d ed. 2012).
38. C.S. KRISHNAMOORTHY & S. RAJEEV, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND EXPERT SYSTEMS FOR
ENGINEERS 5–6 (1996).
39. Harry Surden, Machine Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 89 (2014) [hereinafter
Surden, Machine Learning].
40. JONES, supra note 35, at 250–52.
41. Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 529 (2015)
[hereinafter Calo, Robotics].
42. Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677
(2016) [hereinafter Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact]; Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big
Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 123–24 (2017) (“Data mining is the process of finding patterns
among different people or outcomes to determine what aspects make them similar or different.”); see
also Michael Simon, Alvin F. Lindsay, Loly Sosa & Paige Comparato, Lola v. Skadden and the
Automation of the Legal Profession, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 234, 253 (2018) (“Data mining is a process
that ‘extract[s] interesting—nontrivial, implicit, previously unknown and potentially useful—
information from data in large datasets’ and focuses on the properties of datasets.” (quoting JOHANNES
FÜRNKRANZ, DRAGAN GAMBERGER & NADA LAVRAC, FOUNDATIONS OF RULE LEARNING 4
(2012))).
43. Barocas & Selbst, Disparate Impact, supra note 42, at 677.
44. Dorothy Leonard-Barton & John J. Sviokla, Putting Expert Systems to Work, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1988, at 91, 91–93; Andrew Tutt, An FDA for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 92–93
(2017).
45. For example, a decision tree is an algorithm that asks a series of if-then statements which lead
to a conclusion. CHRISTOPH MOLNAR, INTERPRETABLE MACHINE LEARNING: A GUIDE FOR MAKING
BLACK BOX MODELS EXPLAINABLE 102 (2021), https://christophm.github.io/interpretable-mlbook/interpretable-ml.pdf [https://perma.cc/6DL2-E2YW] (“Tree based models split the data
multiple times according to certain cutoff values in the features.”). A decision tree can be created as
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Although the opportunity to untangle the terminology may have long
passed,46 the fact remains that although AI receives popular treatment as
one solitary concept, AI really represents a diverse array of techniques,
goals, and uses. Because these differences may impact the applicability,
relevance, and relative usefulness of legal rules developed to govern AI,
legal professionals, law-makers, and judicial arbiters must strive to
overcome the confusion that results from lumping a diverse array of
technologies into one term.47 Machine learning, neural networks, and
robotics currently receive the most attention in both the literature and
mainstream media. In fact, people commonly use the term AI to refer to a
system that is more accurately described as a machine learning
algorithm.48 Machine learning refers broadly to “computer algorithms that
have the ability to ‘learn’ or improve in performance over time on some
task.”49 Notably, a variety of techniques can be used to give machine
learning algorithms the ability to “learn” over time, and the extent to
which such “learning” is supervised by humans also varies.50 Meanwhile,
a neural network involves designing algorithmic systems modeled after
an expert system, in which experts determine the cutoff values in the features, see, e.g., Shweta
Taneja, Harsh Goyal, Deepanshu Khandelwal, Abhishek & Aayush Aggarwal, A Decision Tree Based
Expert System for Medical Diagnosis, 3 INT’L J. ENGINEERING APPLIED SCI. & TECH., no. 9, 2018, at
11, 12–15 (developing an expert system that uses a decision tree algorithm to predict disease), or via
machine learning models, where algorithms predict the outcome of a decision tree analysis given
certain input data, MOLNAR, supra, at 102–03. Other rules-based algorithms assign weights to
different variables, creating a numeric output that reflects the values of the variables. Tutt, supra note
44, at 93 (describing Google’s “PageRank Algorithm”).
46. See Amanda Levendowski, How Copyright Law Can Fix Artificial Intelligence’s Implicit Bias
Problem, 93 WASH. L. REV. 579, 590 n.38 (2018).
47. For insightful research demonstrating the link between the nuances of AI and corresponding
legal and policy responses, see Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
Explainable Machines, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1085, 1099–109 (2018) [hereinafter Selbst & Barocas,
Explainable Machines]; Surden, AI Overview, supra note 25, at 1311.
48. Levendowski, supra note 46, at 590 (“When journalists, researchers, and even engineers say
‘AI,’ they tend to be talking about machine learning, a field that blends mathematics, statistics, and
computer science to create computer programs with the ability to improve through experience
automatically.”).
49. Surden, Machine Learning, supra note 39, at 88 (citing PETER FLACH, MACHINE LEARNING:
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA 3 (2012)); see also Cary
Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the MachineLearning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1157 (2017) (explaining that machine learning algorithms
“‘optimize a performance criterion using example data or past experience.’ In other words, these
algorithms make repeated passes through data sets, progressively modifying or averaging their
predictions to optimize specified criteria”).
50. Simon et al., supra note 42, at 254 (“Machine learning can take place in a number of ways.
These include ‘supervised learning,’ where the learning algorithm is given inputs and desired outputs
with the goal of learning which rules lead to the desired outputs; ‘unsupervised learning,’ where the
learning algorithm is left on its own to determine the relationships within a dataset; and ‘reinforcement
learning,’ where the algorithm is provided feedback on its performance as it navigates a data set.”).

Reyes (Do Not Delete)

1464

12/14/2021 10:00 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1453

the human brain.51 A deep neural network uses several layers of neural
network computation.52 Deep neural networks power “deep learning,”53
commonly considered a form of machine learning.54 Robotics, for its part,
suffers from a definitional difficulty similar to that of AI more broadly.55
One commonly used definition, derived from the technological concept of
robotics, comes from Professor Ryan Calo: “artificial objects or systems
that sense, process, and act upon the world to at least some degree.”56
Ultimately then, the definitional difficulty and the disciplinary complexity
that marks the whole of AI also pervades many of the various individual
AI disciplines. This diversity in computational techniques highlights the
importance of ensuring that legal rules acknowledge technological
differences, as those differences may require different policy and legal
approaches.
If recognizing the diversity of computational techniques that make up
the field of AI represents one important paradigm at the intersection of AI
and law, a second is that all technology is social technology—technology
created for, in, and shaped by a particular social context.57 Many
discussions of AI, algorithms, machine learning, and robots treat the
technology as a technical artifact set apart, featuring a surprising
preoccupation with the technology’s ability to operate without human

51. JONES, supra note 35, at 250–52.
52. Matthew Dixon, Diego Klabjan & Jin Hoon Bang, Classification-Based Financial Markets
Prediction Using Deep Neural Networks, 6 ALGORITHMIC FIN. 67, 67 (2017).
53. Id.
54. PETER STONE, RODNEY BROOKS, ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, RYAN CALO, OREN ETZIONI, GREG
HAGER, JULIA HIRSCHBERG, SHIVARAM KALYANAKRISHNAN, ECE KAMAR, SARIT KRAUS, KEVIN
LEYTON-BROWN, DAVID PARKES, WILLIAM PRESS, ANNALEE SAXENIAN, JULIE SHAH, MILIND
TAMBE & ASTRO TELLER, STANFORD UNIV., ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & LIFE IN 2030: ONE
HUNDRED
YEAR
STUDY
ON
ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE
8–9
(2016),
https://ai100.stanford.edu/sites/g/files/sbiybj18871/files/media/file/ai100report10032016fnl_singles.
pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2021).
55. Lemley & Casey, Remedies for Robots, supra note 13, at 1319 (“Though ‘robot’ has appeared
in common parlance for nearly a century, the term is still notoriously resistant to definition.”);
Rachum-Twaig, supra note 14, at 1145 (“There is substantial literature attempting to define and
articulate the features of self-operating devices and machines, usually referred to as robots.”).
56. Calo, Robotics, supra note 41, at 529–31.
57. See, e.g., Reyes & Ward, supra note 32, at 344 (proposing a method for evaluating algorithms
that prominently features consideration of social context); Mike Ananny & Kate Crawford, Seeing
Without Knowing: Limitations of the Transparency Ideal and Its Application to Algorithmic
Accountability, 20 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 973, 974 (2018) (describing AI systems “as sociotechnical
systems that do not contain complexity but enact complexity by connecting to and intertwining with
assemblages of humans and non-humans”); Madeleine Clare Elish & Danah Boyd, Situating Methods
in the Magic of Big Data and AI, 85 COMMC’N MONOGRAPHS 57, 57 (2018) (developing a framework
to remind users of AI that “all knowledge work is situated in practice”).
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intervention.58 In reality, although the computational aspects of AI are
often quite complex,59 even complex AI operations involve human touch
points. Namely, the selection of the data, the design of the computation
performed on it, and the way the resulting output is used in the world are
all elements of AI shaped by the social context—and the humans
operating in the social context—in which the AI is deployed.60 We might
think of these elements—data selection, computational design, use of
outputs, and any audit mechanisms—as contextual components.61
Together, the computational components and contextual components
form an AI system.62 Focusing the discussion of legal personhood on the
AI system, rather than merely the computational components, recognizes
the role of AI in society as both a technical and symbolic artifact63 and
recenters the policy questions on the demands the social context places on
the AI system, rather than the unpredictable, opaque, and sometimes
emergent nature of the computational components.64
Importantly, thinking about any of the computational techniques that

58. See, e.g., Banteka, supra note 26, at 547 (arguing for caution in attributing legal personhood to
AI, in part because AI can take unpredictable action); Lemley & Casey, supra note 13, at 1334
(expressing concerns that because robots learn without much human supervision, they can take
unpredictable actions and may cause unforeseen harms). The preoccupation with questions of liability
because AI can take action without human intervention is particularly surprising considering that
“many successful AI systems are not fully autonomous but rather involve hybrids of computer and
human decision-making.” Surden, AI Overview, supra note 25, at 1320.
59. See, e.g., Martin Giles, The GANfather: The Man Who’s Given Machines the Gift of
Imagination, MIT TECH. REV., Mar. 2018, at 48, 51 (explaining the complex mechanics of generative
adversarial networks); CHIHEB TRABELSI, OLEXA BILANIUK, YING ZHANG, DMITRIY SERDYUK,
SANDEEP SUBRAMANIAN, JOÃO FELIPE SANTOS, SOROUSH MEHRI, NEGAR ROSTAMZADEH, YOSHUA
BENGIO
&
CHRISTOPHER
J.
PAL,
DEEP
COMPLEX
NETWORKS
2
(2018)
https://openreview.net/pdf?id=H1T2hmZAb [https://perma.cc/C9WS-8G5K] (offering a formulation
to help “exploit the advantages offered by complex representations” of neural network).
60. See Reyes & Ward, supra note 32, at 354–56; Giuffrida, supra note 13, at 442 (“AI systems do
not perform in an informational vacuum.”).
61. Reyes & Ward, supra note 32, at 349–53.
62. Id. at 345–46, 345 fig.1. Notably, in our prior work, Professor Ward and I dealt primarily with
algorithmic systems, but the concept applies with equal force for AI systems, particularly given the
definitional discussion of AI systems powered by algorithms above. See supra notes 46–56 and
accompanying text.
63. Lipshaw, supra note 29, at 8–9 (“A technical artifact is one, like a tool or a machine, that serves
a utilitarian, productive purpose.” (citing Suchman, supra note 29, at 99–100)). “A symbolic artifact,
on the other hand, is one that carries a cultural message.” Id. at 9. AI systems combine a technical
artifact—the computational components—with symbolic artifacts—the contextual components. As a
result, while we tend to think of AI as simply a technical artifact (usually focusing on the
computational components), it is more appropriately thought of as AI systems.
64. It is worth noting initially here that this Article undertakes the “Algorithmic Systems Query”
methodology developed in Reyes & Ward, supra note 32, at 353, in performing its analysis of
personhood for AI systems generally, and autonomous corporations in particular. For further details
regarding this methodology, see infra note 120.
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we commonly associate with AI as part of a broader system forces the
legal discussion to narrow considerably. Rather than asking broadly
whether AI should receive the rights and duties associated with legal
personhood, the question becomes narrower: when AI is deployed in a
specific socio-legal context, under which circumstances and to what
extent should the AI system receive certain rights and duties associated
with legal personhood? This Article thus takes one socio-legal context in
which society actively deploys AI and other autonomous technology—the
formation and operation of corporations—and uses it to illustrate how the
legal norms around both AI personhood and corporate personhood might
shift if the law accounted for the socio-technical context of AI systems.
B.

The ABR Taxonomy Emphasizes the Importance of Context.

Although an autonomous business may sound futuristic, the reality is
that businesses already automate their affairs in a variety of ways. In prior
work, I documented many of those variances and their genesis in tradeoffs made by founders and management with regard to the relative level
of operational and managerial automation used to carry out a specific
business.65 This investigation into industry adoption of autonomous
technologies generated a taxonomy of autonomous business reality—the
“ABR Taxonomy.”66 In the context of artificial legal personhood, the
ABR Taxonomy demonstrates the gaps between current legal approaches
and actual socio-contextual needs for AI personhood and corporate
personhood in autonomous businesses. As more fully explained below,
the ABR Taxonomy is comprised of three groups and six categories of
autonomous businesses,67 as visually summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: The ABR Taxonomy
Traditional Plus

Distributed Business
Entities

Autonomous Entities

1

2

3

4

5

6

Primarily
Operationally
Automated

Managerial
Automation
Light

Autonomous
Mediating
Hierarchy

Mostly
Autonomous

Fully
Autonomous

Algorithmic
Entities

65. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20.
66. Id. at 481–89 (explaining the taxonomy, the underlying theory, and each of the examples).
67. Id. at 473–76, 473 tbl.1.
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As a starting point, the ABR Taxonomy recognizes that business
founders and managers generally choose between two types of
automation: operational and managerial.68 Operational automation “refers
to the use of technology to automate routine operations within a business
in order to capitalize on efficiency gains and grow economies of scale.”69
Managerial automation, on the other hand, “refer[s] to the use of
technology by a business . . . to automate some level of its internal
management functions.”70 When business automation is viewed as a
cross-section of operational and managerial automation, roughly six
potential categories of autonomous businesses emerge.71 First, businesses
that primarily automate operations (“Primarily Operationally Automated”
businesses) retain traditional management structures while innovating
with technology to make processes and resource allocation more
efficient.72 Examples of such businesses include Amazon’s automation of
its warehouses using robots, or an automotive dealer using a chatbot on
its website to attract customers.73 A second group of businesses also
retains traditional management structures, but uses technology to
eliminate certain inefficient levels of middle management (“Managerial
Automation Light” businesses).74 For example, using algorithms to
automatically match drivers and riders allows Uber to eliminate certain
middle management roles that typically characterize traditional taxi
companies, such as centralized taxi dispatch stations.75 Despite all the
“platform” hype Uber attracts as a result of this use of technology, Uber
nevertheless remains a traditional corporation with managerial power
centered in its board of directors.76 At their core, then, both “Primarily
68. Id. at 463.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 473. For a visual depiction, see id. at 473 tbl.1.
72. Id. at 473–74.
73. Id. at 463.
74. Id. at 473–74.
75. Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
31, 52–53 (2016) (describing how Uber uses technology to eliminate the role of centralized taxi
dispatchers and perform some measure of quality control); Mareike Möhlmann & Ola Henfridsson,
What People Hate About Being Managed by Algorithms, According to a Study of Uber Drivers,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 30, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/what-people-hate-about-being-managedby-algorithms-according-to-a-study-of-uber-drivers [https://perma.cc/KZM8-7VBR] (“Companies
are increasingly using algorithms to manage their remote workforces. Called ‘algorithmic
management,’ this approach has been most widely adopted in gig economy companies. For example,
ride-hailing company Uber substantially increases its efficiency by managing some three million
workers with an app that instructs drivers which passengers to pick up and which route to take.”).
76. Abbey Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and Its Implications for Regulating
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Operationally Automated and Managerial Automation Light businesses
share certain governance characteristics.”77 Namely, “both types of
businesses continue to be governed by traditional structures like corporate
officers, a board of directors and shareholders,” even while using
technology to do something innovative within their business.78 Together,
these two categories of businesses form a broader “Traditional Plus”
group in the taxonomy.79
A third category of businesses seek to “almost fully automate[] their
services or production process and [also] eliminate[] [professional]
management at all levels such that owners directly manage [and operate]
the business.”80 In other words, these businesses attempt to use digital
technology as the mediating hierarchy that the legal technology of the
corporate form usually provides (“Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy”
businesses).81 A variety of existing businesses operate as Autonomous
Mediating Hierarchy businesses, many of them quite successfully. For
example, MakerDAO is the decentralized autonomous organization
responsible for creating and maintaining the value of DAI, a stablecoin
with a market cap of around $1 billion.82 Dash, which operates as a formal
business trust,83 manages a cryptocurrency with a total market cap of over
$1.6 billion.84 A fourth category—”Mostly Autonomous”—goes further
in automating management by eliminating owners all together.85
Innovation, 67 EMORY L.J. 197, 207 (2017) (arguing that companies commonly referred as operating
within the “sharing economy” are motivated by profit, not altruism); see also Leadership, UBER,
https://www.uber.com/newsroom/leadership/ [https://perma.cc/B7CV-G8B9].
77. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 474.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. CAMPBELL R. HARVEY, ASHWIN RAMACHANDRAN & JOEY SANTORO, DEFI AND THE FUTURE
OF FINANCE 39–44 (2021).
83. For a detailed explanation of the Dash DAO and its business trust legal structure, see Reyes,
ABR, supra note 20, at 442, 467.
84. Dash, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/dash/historical-data/ (last
visited Nov. 28, 2021) (market cap value as of June 12, 2021).
85. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 474. One example of this type of “Mostly Autonomous” business
is the Plantoid. Id. at 474–75. No humans own a Plantoid, but rather, each Plantoid and its operations
are managed by distributed computer code via blockchain technology. Id. at 468–69.
Essentially, each Plantoid is a metallic sculpture displayed in a public place. . . . When a passerby appreciates the Plantoid’s beauty, he or she can send a token of appreciation to the Plantoid
by sending cryptocurrency to the Plantoid’s wallet. The funds received then belong to the DAO
powering the Plantoid. The smart contracts running the DAO require that when the Plantoid
accumulates sufficient funds, the Plantoid will request proposals from artists to create a new
Plantoid. Other than the selection of the winning artist proposal and the actual creation of new
Plantoids, the Plantoid DAO automates the entire art production enterprise.
Id. at 468–69 (citations omitted).
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Autonomous Mediating Hierarchy businesses and Mostly Autonomous
businesses share certain characteristics that allow them to be grouped
together as “Distributed Business Entities.”86 Specifically, all Distributed
Business Entities demonstrate “a high or nearly complete level of
operational automation and a high or nearly complete level of managerial
automation.”87
Only one category of existing business goes further than Distributed
Business Entities in terms of operational and managerial automation:
“Fully Autonomous” businesses. Fully Autonomous businesses are, as the
name implies, fully automated in terms of both operations and
management, but still involve humans at some level.88 In other words,
even though code fully controls both operations and management of Fully
Autonomous businesses, humans still maintain and update the code, such
that this is a distinct category from Professor Lynn LoPucki’s
“Algorithmic Entities,” which never experience human touch points after
launch.89 “Together, Fully Autonomous businesses and Algorithmic
Entities comprise a generalizable group of ‘Autonomous Entities.’”90
Unpacking the implications of the ABR Taxonomy for autonomous
corporate personhood begins by examining recent scholarship that
investigates a variety of methods by which legally recognizable business
enterprises may be partially or fully automated, with the business
operated—partially or fully—by computer code.91 The leading
investigations into algorithmic or autonomous business associations take
starkly different views regarding whether and to what extent autonomous
businesses should enjoy legal rights as well as duties.92 On the one hand,
scholars argue that algorithmic or autonomous business entities should not
be treated differently under the law than any other business entity because
the only difference is one of degree rather than kind.93 Other scholars,
however, warn of the significant risks posed by algorithmic entities and
argue that those risks justify different legal treatment.94 Professor Shawn
86. Id. at 475.
87. Id.
88. Id. A key example of Fully Autonomous entities is Metronome, which autonomously manages
a cryptocurrency MET. Id. at 469. MET is currently valued at a market cap of $39 million.
Metronome, COINMARKETCAP, https://coinmarketcap.com/currencies/metronome/historical-data/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2021) (market cap as of June 12, 2021).
89. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 475 (citing LoPucki, supra note 21, at 897).
90. Id.
91. See generally Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22; LoPucki, supra, note 21; Reyes, Rockefeller,
supra note 21.
92. For my part, I have deferred taking a position, until now.
93. Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1498–1500.
94. See LoPucki, supra note 21.
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Bayern was the first to offer a systematic investigation into the possibility
of autonomous business enterprises through “independently wealthy
software.”95 Bayern recognized that autonomous computer software—
from computer viruses to machine learning algorithms—already
permeates society.96 The introduction of bitcoin97 and blockchain
technology meant that such software could more easily retain and manage
wealth independently from human interfaces.98 From Bayern’s
perspective, the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(RULLCA)99 already explicitly provides for the possibility that an LLC
may operate without any members.100 Bayern explains that, in his view,
this reality naturally flows from the law’s long history of creating fictional
entities and treating them like people for certain purposes.101
In particular, Professor Bayern focuses on the capacity of law to confer
what he refers to as “private-law personhood”: “the capacity of person,
system or legal entity to be recognized by law sufficiently to perform basic
legal functions.”102 In limiting the discussion to “the ability to participate
in the fundamental relationships regulated by private law—such as the
capability to own property, enter a contract, file a lawsuit, be named in a

95. Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1492.
96. Id.
97. In technology circles, the Bitcoin software, protocol, and network are referenced using the
uppercase “Bitcoin,” while the lowercase “bitcoin” refers to individual units of account. Angela
Walch, The Bitcoin Blockchain as Financial Market Infrastructure: A Consideration of Operational
Risk, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 837, 846 & n.41 (2015).
98. “[A] system like Bitcoin is not functionally necessary for this possibility; more precisely, then,
what Bitcoin enables for autonomous software is the convenient, ‘legal access to a functionally
independent financial life. It practically enables what in the past was just a theoretical possibility.’”
Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 453 n.102 (quoting Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1493).
99. Originally promulgated by the Uniform Law Commission in 1996 and revised in 2006 as part
of the Uniform Law Commission’s Harmonization of Business Entity Acts project, the RULLCA is
a model LLC enabling statute, a version of which, as of this writing, has been introduced or adopted
in twenty-four states. See Limited Liability Company Act, Revised, UNIF. L. COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=bbea059c-6853-4f45b69b-7ca2e49cf740 [https://perma.cc/8F2A-N3BA].
100. Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1496–97 (explaining that the RULLCA includes “in a
list of events that cause the dissolution of an LLC, ‘the passage of 90 consecutive days during which
the company has no members,’” and that “this provision, perhaps surprisingly, appears not to be a
mandatory rule imposed by the uniform statute.” (citing RULLCA §§ 110(c), 701(a)(3) (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 2006))); Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 21, at 101–02 (explaining how to create
an autonomous and memberless LLC).
101. Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1495.
102. Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 21, at 94–95. Note that among scholars who
investigate the scope and nature of corporate constitutional rights, Bayern’s concept of “private-law
personhood” is merely corporate personhood, while what Bayern considers a broader, politicized view
of corporate personhood is thought of as corporate personality and the results of corporate personality
theory. See discussion infra note 119.
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lawsuit, serve as a legal principal, and serve as a legal agent,” Bayern
explicitly refrained from engaging any questions related to an autonomous
legal entity’s potential enjoyment of constitutional rights.103 Bayern then
argues that private-law personhood confers such a limited set of rights that
conferring it to autonomous systems does not pose a particularly radical
or important change to existing law.104 Ultimately, Bayern concludes that
“there appear to be many organizational advantages, and few systematic
downsides, in permitting memberless entities that a nonhuman system
might ‘inhabit’ and use as an interface to the rest of private law.”105
Professor LoPucki considers Professor Bayern’s argument and
concludes that several qualities of what Professor LoPucki terms
“algorithmic entities”106 make their potential existence a “risk of
existential catastrophe” at the hands of artificial intelligence.107 Skipping
past the idea of private-law personhood, LoPucki argues that algorithmic
control of a legal entity without human control presents significant danger
because algorithms could “accumulate wealth, leverage it in capital
markets, and participate in the political process—without being subject to
the constraints under which humans operate.”108 Professor LoPucki does
not seem to view the eventual, algorithmic-entity apocalypse as being a
function of the doctrine of corporate personhood.109 Rather, Professor
103. Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 21, at 94–95.
104. See id. at 106–07. First, Bayern says that an autonomous fictional entity with private-law
personhood really does not pose that different of a scenario than what can be accomplished by private
parties using technology creatively now. Id. at 106. Second, Bayern contends that if an autonomous
system did organize as an LLC and conduct ordinary business operations, the public, including
customers, suppliers, and regulators, would be unlikely to discern its status as a business operated by
artificial intelligence, absent extraordinary circumstances. Id. at 108.
105. Id. at 109.
106. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 897. LoPucki categorizes an entity as “‘algorithmic’ if an algorithm
controls it.” Id. For LoPucki, “[a]n algorithm is a set of decision-making rules[, and t]he relevant
algorithms run on computers. They are programs—artificial intelligences—that make and execute
decisions in response to external circumstances.” Id. Notably, for LoPucki, an algorithm controls the
entity if a human created the algorithm but cannot thereafter modify the algorithm. Id. I am skeptical
about the potential near-term proliferation of such algorithms. As I have previously commented,
because algorithms are fundamentally “computer software, they require regular updates, patches and
other ‘modifications’ that may require human activity.” Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, 455 n.117.
107. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 897.
108. Id. at 901–02.
109. Id. at 902–03. In particular, Professor LoPucki predicts that three qualities of artificial entities
make them exceptional, and thus a greater threat to society than algorithms acting with human
collaborators. The term “exceptionalism” generally refers to the idea “that a person, place, object, or
concept is qualitatively different from others in the same basic category.” Calo, Robotics, supra note
41, at 550. In the context of AI and other emerging technologies, Ryan Calo encourages us to only
consider a technology exceptional, such that it requires new, specific laws “when its introduction into
the mainstream requires a systematic change to the law or legal institutions in order to reproduce, or
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LoPucki identifies corporate charter competition as the root of the
problem.110 From his perspective,
the natural culmination of charter competition is a system that
does not restrict at all. . . . By embracing the charter competition,
the United States has become the world’s largest supplier of
anonymous entities and enabled its corporate service providers to
achieve the world’s lowest rate of compliance with the
international standards designed to prevent terrorist financing and
money-laundering.111
The debate between Bayern and LoPucki reflects the difficulty of
capturing the full picture of autonomous businesses—a difficulty that the
ABR Taxonomy can be used to help resolve.
The ABR Taxonomy helps identify the unaccounted-for sociocontextual needs of autonomous businesses seeking to interact with
natural and legal people under existing law. Specifically, the ABR
Taxonomy reveals the gaps between the theories of legal personhood
advanced in both the arenas of corporate law and artificial intelligence. In
the context of corporate legal personhood, the ABR Taxonomy reveals
that positioning a corporation, whether autonomous or not, as only one
thing or other risks missing the depth and texture of the design trade-offs
made by founders at the time of incorporation.112 The debate between
LoPucki and Bayern is illustrative here. The wide variance between the
two scholars’ positions on the relative benefits and dangers of enabling an
autonomous legal person through a business entity reflects the different
type of autonomous entity each seeks to address. Professor Bayern
specifically intends to reflect upon autonomous systems at a general level
without singling out any specific technology or instantiation of

if necessary displace, an existing balance of values.” Id. at 552. First, LoPucki believes because
algorithmic entities will lack sympathy or empathy, they will exhibit ruthlessness to a degree not seen
in humans. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 904. Second, society will experience more difficulty in
deterring bad activity by algorithmic entities because they cannot be incarcerated the same way a
human controller can, and algorithmic entities will be immune to the social pressures to which human
controllers would otherwise respond. Id. Finally, LoPucki sees algorithmic entities as more easily
replicated, making algorithmic entities: better able to flee jurisdictions, more difficult to destroy,
better at hedging against regulatory changes, and better able to collude together for the economic
detriment of others. Id. at 904–05. Ultimately, LoPucki argues that algorithmic entities become even
more difficult to control because they will be hard to detect in their various forms and can migrate
across state and national borders to avoid detection and regulation. Id. at 924, 937.
110. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 889, 952–53. This appears to be LoPucki’s chief concern, and this
concern ties into his broader literature regarding corporate charter competition. See Lynn M. LoPucki,
Corporate Charter Competition, 102 MINN. L. REV. 2101 (2018).
111. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 952.
112. See id.
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technology.113 By focusing on LLCs, Professor Bayern also makes it easy
to avoid the complex constitutional rights arguments discussed in the
corporate personhood literature.
Professor LoPucki’s vision of algorithmic entities, on the other hand,
demonstrates the viability of an autonomous corporation,114 thrusting the
corporate rights questions to the foreground. Yet, because LoPucki’s
vision depends upon technology so autonomous as to never encounter
human control or modification at any point after launch,115 the discussion
of corporate rights as a vehicle for granting legal personhood to artificial
intelligence reverts to discussions of the Personless Corporation and its
impossibility given the current state of the art in AI. The ABR Taxonomy
highlights the jurisprudential gap left by dismissing AI personhood via the
corporate vehicle because of its “impossibility.”
The ABR Taxonomy demonstrates that autonomous businesses already
exist and makes clear that the wide variance between Bayern’s and
LoPucki’s respective visions of autonomous entities mirrors the wide
variance in actual business automation. In other words, the context
matters. Bayern’s analysis really centers on businesses with
characteristics of those in the Autonomous Distributed Business Entity
category.116 Meanwhile, LoPucki’s analysis zeroes in on Algorithmic

113. Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 21, at 96–97 (“One final note before proceeding: in
referring to autonomous systems in this Article, I mean to do so broadly. The Article’s conclusions
are applicable to many different types of systems. On one end of the spectrum, an ‘autonomous
system’ might be a fairly mundane, conventional program that performs a defined role, such as a
network of computer processes that operates vending machines that accept Bitcoin (or some other
online payment that requires not specific interface with the legal recognition or titling of bank
accounts.). On the other, it might—in the future—be an intelligent robot that passes the Turing
Test. . . . [L]ittle of my legal discussion depends on specific attributes or capabilities of autonomous
systems themselves.”).
114. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 907–11.
115. Id. at 897 (“For the purposes of this Article, an algorithm controls an entity only if the
algorithm makes the entity’s decisions without human participation. That a human created the
algorithm does not disqualify the algorithm from status as a controller, provided that the human no
longer has the ability to modify the algorithm.”).
116. See Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra note 21, at 93, 95–96 (using LLCs as a framework
to suggest that autonomous systems could be given legal personhood). For example, by focusing on
zero member LLCs and other unique LLC operating structures, Bayern clearly does not mean to
address companies in the Traditional Plus category, which maintain traditional management structures
but use autonomous systems to improve their business or product. By acknowledging that some
human involvement may be needed to maintain the code after launch or to provide certain services
(like legal services or activities offline), Bayern also indicates that he is not focused on Algorithmic
Entities. See Bayern, Of Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1497. Bayern’s analysis may apply to Fully
Autonomous entities as well, however, so few exist that the core of his work focuses on Distributed
Business Entities. See id. at 1498 (noting several futuristic Fully Autonomous entities to which his
analysis may apply, but clarifying that they are “fanciful”).
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Entities.117 The traditional corporate personhood jurisprudence and
literature, for its part, applies to the Traditional Plus corporations. When
viewed in this light, through the prism of the ABR Taxonomy, the gap in
the current discussion at the intersection of AI, corporations and
personhood becomes clear—the lack of a theory of personhood for AI that
uses the corporation as a vehicle to interact with the world either as a
Distributed Business Entity or as a Fully Autonomous entity. To develop
a theory of legal personhood for Distributed Business Entities and Fully
Autonomous entities while also avoiding the theory-jumping that so
frustrates the scholarly community studying corporate personhood,118 the
analysis should begin by applying the theories of corporate personality to
the spectrum of operational and managerial automation among
autonomous entities. Ultimately, the ABR Taxonomy suggests that
whether an autonomous corporation should receive constitutional rights
under one or more of the corporate personality theories should depend
upon an analysis of the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the autonomous
corporation. The analysis under this socio-contextual approach, will, of
course, implicate notions of legal personhood for AI systems as well.
II.

EXPLORING THE CONTOURS OF AUTONOMOUS
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD THROUGH AI PERSONHOOD

This Part takes the discussion of autonomous businesses into an area
the literature previously avoided: artificial personality.119 The discussion
117. See LoPucki, supra note 21, at 897 (coining the term “algorithmic entity” and defining it to
include those entities controlled by an algorithm, where “[a]n algorithm is a set of decision-making
rules” operating on a computer as a program that executes decisions in response to external
circumstances, and where an algorithm controls an entity when it makes the entity’s decisions without
human participation).
118. See, e.g., Chatman, supra note 18, at 818–30 (exploring the history of Supreme Court use of
corporate theories to argue that “generations of the Court’s misunderstanding about corporations have
resulted in corporate rights decisions that are a hodgepodge of erroneous claims about the nature of
corporations and how they function”); Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11,
at 1670–75 (considering the various difficulties that may contribute to the “lack of coherence” in the
Supreme Court’s corporate personhood doctrine); Pollman, Corporate Privacy, supra note 17, at 50
(“As we have seen, the Court has confronted issues concerning the applicability and scope of
constitutional protections for corporations for over two hundred years. In all of this time, it has failed
to articulate a test or standard approach for its rulings.”); James D. Nelson, Conscience, Incorporated,
2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1565, 1567 (“[C]ourts do not have a workable theory to guide their
analysis.”).
119. Bayern considers this a broader, more politicized conception of legal personhood, and
distinguishes it from what he calls “private-law personhood.” Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra
note 21, at 95. The private law conception of legal personhood relates to “the ability to participate in
the fundamental relationships regulated by private law—such as the capacity to own property, enter
a contract, file a lawsuit, be named in a lawsuit, serve as a legal principle, and serve as a legal agent.”
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of artificial personality first reviews the literature relating to theories of
AI personhood. Doing so enables the identification of the common sociolegal needs that drive the personhood debates in the context of AI systems
and demonstrates the importance of the socio-technical context for
building appropriate legal rules related to AI.120 In this regard, the ABR
Taxonomy acts as an analytical framework through which to assess
whether and how the AI personhood literature applies to assess
autonomous corporate personhood—where AI personhood and corporate
personhood collide. Tying the autonomous business discussion to the
artificial personhood discussion unpacks the importance of context for
Id. at 94–95. Corporate personhood scholars, on the other hand, use “corporate personhood” to refer
to the binary issue of whether a corporation should be treated as a person. See, e.g., Stefan J. Padfield,
Does Corporate Personhood Matter? A Review of, and Response to, Adam Winkler’s We the
Corporations, 20 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 1009, 1010 & n.3 (2019) [hereinafter Padfield,
Does Corporate Personhood Matter] (“Corporate personhood may be understood as a binary concept,
which is to say a corporation either is or is not a person for purposes of a particular statute or
Constitutional provision.”). These scholars use “corporate personality” to refer to the specific theories
of personhood and the legal consequences (including constitutional rights) that flow from a decision
to treat a corporation as a person. Stefan J. Padfield, A New Social Contract: Corporate Personality
Theory and the Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 363, 372 (2017) [hereinafter,
Padfield, A New Social Contract] (“Theories of corporate personality attempt to describe the nature
of corporations in ways that can hopefully assist legislatures, judges, and society in general determine
the proper role for corporations in society, as well as the proper scope of regulations to be applied to
corporations.”); Padfield, Does Corporate Personhood Matter, supra, at 1010 & n.3 (“Corporate
personality theory, on the other hand, may be understood as answering the subsequent; and perhaps
more important question: What kind of person is the corporation?”). Bayern’s use of the term
“political corporate personhood” indicates the reality that some consequences of saying “yes” to
whether a corporation is a person center in private law (the corporation can sue and be sued in its own
right, the corporation is taxed as a separate entity, etc.), while other consequences sound in public law
issues (the extent and nature of corporate constitutional rights). Bayern, Autonomous Systems, supra
note 21, at 95. Because this Article seeks to bridge the gap between the generally private law literature
on algorithmic and autonomous business entities and the generally public law-oriented literature on
corporate personhood more broadly, this Article adopts the terminology employed by prominent
corporate personhood scholars.
120. A note on methodology: this Article seeks to propose legal rules for autonomous corporate
personhood by loosely following the Algorithmic Systems Query (ASQ) method of analysis. Reyes
& Ward, supra note 32. ASQ teaches that building legal rules for an AI system requires first assessing
the actual needs of the social context in which the AI system will be deployed. Id. at 353–55. Here,
that social context is the autonomous corporation’s ability to act in the world with legal personality.
Because an autonomous corporation represents the nexus of an AI system and corporations, this
Article reviews the literature related to artificial personhood for both AI systems and corporations
with an eye toward identifying the policy needs driving the debates. ASQ then drives the analysis to
consider the current reality of the social context, and whether the current rules actually achieve the
policy needs. Id. at 356. Here, the current reality of autonomous corporations is represented in the
Autonomous Business Taxonomy. Thus, Parts II and III, infra, use the Taxonomy to identify gaps
between the current personhood debates in AI systems and corporate law and the reality of
autonomous businesses trying to act with legal force in the world. The last step in ASQ is to optimize
the system given the various socio-technical and socio-legal factors. Id. at 357. As a result, Part IV
identifies links between AI system personhood theories and corporate personhood theories to propose
a new approach that fills existing gaps.
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determining which rights to grant artificial persons, whether corporation
or machine.
A.

Artificial Intelligence and the Artificial Person Conundrum

The inquiry into autonomous corporate personhood begins with the
literature surrounding the possibility of AI personhood. Indeed, concern
about how society should respond when a technical artifact poses as a
person is not new.121 Broadly speaking, society becomes concerned with
attributing legal personhood to technical artifacts when such artifacts
become what Bruno Latour calls an “actant.”122 Latour defines an actant
as “anything that [modifies] a state of affairs by making a difference.”123
Society reacts differently to the idea of a technical artifact taking
independent action (becoming an actant) than when humans use
technology to act.124 Generally, the law only attributes rights and duties to
those imbued with personhood.125 And only those with duties can be held
liable for harm in many circumstances.126 Thus, with the increased
121. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 30, at 452; First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 777
(1978) (noting when a corporation speaks, the fact that the speaker is a technical artifact should be
overlooked in favor of the nature of the speech); Miles v. City Council of Augusta, 710 F.2d 1542,
1543 (11th Cir. 1983) (considering whether a talking cat could exert constitutional speech rights);
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (with Notes on Animal Rights), 47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1336
(2000) (arguing that animals have rights and should be accorded standing in judicial proceedings);
Jessica Berg, Of Elephants and Embryos: A Proposed Framework for Legal Personhood, 59
HASTINGS L.J. 369, 386–87 (2007) (proposing a framework for evaluating the personhood status of
novel and unrecognized entities); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495 (2013)
(considering whether speech created by algorithmic outputs receives First Amendment protection);
Madeline Lamo & Ryan Calo, Regulating Bot Speech, 66 UCLA L. REV. 988, 990 (2019) (considering
when automated agents (“bots”) push statements to online forums such that content appears to come
from natural persons); Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENV’T L. 49
(2018) (considering the contours of legal personhood for environmental protection).
122. BRUNO LATOUR, REASSEMBLING THE SOCIAL: AN INTRODUCTION TO ACTOR-NETWORKTHEORY 71 (2005).
123. Id.
124. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Consumer Finance and AI: The Death of Second
Opinions?, 22 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 319, 342–46 (2020) (investigating the reduced
likelihood that consumers will seek a second opinion when AI provides financial advice as compared
to when humans provide financial advice); Lemley & Casey, Remedies for Robots, supra note 13, at
1314–16 (explaining that the goals of remedies law do not fit well when harm is committed by a robot
instead of a human and exploring design options for “a system of remedies for robots”).
125. Tomasz Pietrzykowski, The Idea of Non-Personal Subjects of Law, in LEGAL PERSONHOOD:
ANIMALS, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE UNBORN 49, 51 (Visa A.J. Kurki & Tomasz
Pietrzykowski eds., 2017) (“Personhood is identified with the capacity to have rights and duties.”);
JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 27 (1909) (“In books of the Law, as
in other books, and in common speech, ‘person’ is often used as meaning a human being, but the
technical legal meaning of a ‘person’ is a subject of legal rights and duties.”).
126. See, e.g., Peter Jaffey, Duties and Liabilities in Private Law, 12 LEGAL THEORY 137, 150–51
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prevalence of AI actants in society, the AI personhood literature asks “at
what point [does] it make[] sense to attribute legal consequence of the
actants’ actions to the actants themselves, instead of to the human actants
behind them[?]”127 As scholars struggle with this core question from a
variety of vantage points, they offer a variety of frameworks for use in
making legal personality determinations.
For example, Lawrence Solum argues that to obtain legal personhood,
a technical artifact must have the capacity to perform complex actions
and/or the capacity to act intentionally and with self-consciousness.128
This approach to AI personhood draws heavily on debates about the
nature of personhood in philosophy, which emphasize a variety of
characteristics including intentional, rational thought, free will,
consciousness, and self-awareness, among other similar qualities.129
Ultimately, however, existing technology is far from achieving selfconsciousness.130 Should society then refuse to endow technical artifacts
with personhood at all? Some scholars answer that question
affirmatively131 and argue that any form of AI that falls short of key moral
qualities of personhood should be treated as a tool of the actual persons to
whom it belongs.132 In other words, non-sentient AI, this position argues,

(2006) (exploring the right-duty relationship in private law and proposing a corollary right-liability
relation); Andrew Halpin, Rights, Duties, Liabilities and Hohfeld, 13 LEGAL THEORY 23 (2007)
(agreeing with Jaffrey “that there do exist two quite distinct ways in which the law may determine
that D is under an obligation to pay damages to C: either because D has committed a wrong against
C that the law required him to avoid, or because D has been charged by the law with the responsibility
of compensating C for damage caused as a result of conduct that in itself is perfectly lawful”).
127. Bert-Jaap Koops, Mireille Hildebrandt & David-Olivier Jaquet-Chiffelle, Bridging the
Accountability Gap: Rights for New Entities in the Information Society?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
497, 511 (2010).
128. Solum, supra note 30, at 1240.
129. SUSANA KIM RIPKEN, CORPORATE PERSONHOOD 58 (2019) (“Philosophers have long
theorized over the necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood . . . . Some theoretical
conceptions emphasize that only intentional, rational agents can be persons. Others require free will
and the capacity to form first and second order desires. Still others focus on consciousness, selfawareness, emotional capacity, autonomy of mind and body, or the capacity for language and interpersonal relations.”); Koops et al., supra note 127, at 546.
130. Surden, AI Overview, supra note 25, at 1308–10.
131. This is the conclusion reached by at least one legal scholar. See Banteka, supra note 26, at
538.
132. See Ryan Calo, Robots in American Law 12–15 (Mar. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with Washington Law Review) (describing Comptroller of the Treasury v. Family
Entertainment Centers of Essex, Inc., 519 A.2d 1337 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) as comparing Chuck
E. Cheese’s singing robots to an “embellished juke-box,” and Louis Marx & Co. v. United States, 66
Cust. Ct. 484 (1958) as stating that “[a] robot is ‘not a living thing; it is not endowed with life. A robot
is a mechanical device or apparatus, a mere automation, that operates through scientific or mechanical
media’”).
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should be treated as property.133 Because the current state of the art in AI
falls far short of self-conscious AI, some argue that the AI personhood
debate should end here. Other scholars, considering the nature of AI
personhood, go further because they recognize that legal personhood
exists on a spectrum.134 Under this view, understanding non-sentient AI
as non-person property simply represents one end of the AI personhood
spectrum.
At the other end of the spectrum sit autonomous robots.135 To address
the potential liability gaps resulting from applying traditional legal rules
to the acts or omissions of sophisticated autonomous robots, the European
Parliament created a class of “electronic persons.”136 The European
Parliament felt that the more autonomous the robot, the less the robot
could be categorized as a mere tool used as property by an owner for the
owner’s chosen ends.137 Even when they would not go so far as create a
new class of persons, other scholars call for at least some limited
protections for social robots, on the theory that maltreating

133. Solum, supra note 30, at 1276 (“Finally, the third objection to constitutional personhood for
AIs is that, as artifacts, AIs should never be more than the property of their makers.”).
134. See, e.g., Banteka, supra note 26, at 552 (“[L]egal personhood is a divisible aggregate of rights
and duties. As it is reduced to bundles of rights and duties, the exact number and kind of rights and
duties an entity with legal personhood may enjoy can vary.”); Ignacio N. Cofone, Servers and
Waiters: What Matters in the Law of A.I., 21 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 167, 177–79 (2018) (arguing that
the law should assign rights and responsibilities on a continuum between tools and people); Richard
Tur, The ‘Person’ in Law, in PERSONS AND PERSONALITY: A CONTEMPORARY INQUIRY 116, 121–23
(Arthur Peacocke & Grant Gillett eds., 1987) (noting that legal personality can include a variety of
combinations of rights, capacities, and obligations); Solum, supra note 30, at 1284–87 (considering a
spectrum of personhood rooted in philosophical attributes); Ludvig Beckman, Personhood and Legal
Status: Reflections on the Democratic Rights of Corporations, 47 NETH. J. LEGAL PHIL. 13, 21 (2018)
(exploring the ways in which legal persons can be subject to law and yet not acquire certain rights of
persons); Berg, supra note 121, at 373 (describing juridical persons as those non-human entities to
whom society chooses to grant some of the legal protections enjoyed by natural persons); Gordon,
supra note 121, at 3 (“Legal personhood is not binary; it is not a yes-or-no proposition. The
differentiation of legal rights and responsibilities starts, not ends, at the question of whether something
may or may not be considered a person in the meaning of a statute.”); Koops et al., supra note 127,
at 559 (“To decide whether a specific entity qualifies as a person and the ensuing question of whether
such artificial persons would qualify as legal abstract persons, we could take a relative approach. This
means that next to establishing the preconditions for personhood we should acknowledge different
levels of legal personhood, requiring different legal consequences.”).
135. Calo, Robotics, supra note 41; Filipe Maia Alexandre, The Legal Status of Artificially
Intelligent Robots: Personhood, Taxation & Control (June 1, 2017) (L.L.M. dissertation, Tilburg
University), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2985466 [https://perma.cc/B3PQ9F4E].
136. Gunther Teubner, Digital Personhood? The Status of Autonomous Software Agents in Private
Law, ANCILLA IURIS 106, 113 (2018).
137. May Bulman, EU to Vote on Declaring Robots to be ‘Electronic Persons,’ INDEPENDENT (Jan.
14, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/robots-eu-vote-electronicpersons-european-union-ai-artificial-intelligence-a7527106.html [https://perma.cc/C652-BRNQ].
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anthropomorphized robots might desensitize humans to the harm caused
by certain behavior.138 As anthropomorphism—“the psychological
tendency to treat inanimate objects as though they have human
qualities”—becomes a design element for certain robots, some scholars
encourage a new form of personhood to capture the fact that “[r]obots are
not persons but neither are they merely toasters.”139 In other words, there
exists at least some support for a restricted form of legal personhood that
recognizes the social valence140 of robots without implying sentient
consciousness—some form of hybrid social person.141
Given how far apart the two ends of the spectrum (AI systems as tools
on one end, and AI systems as hybrid-social persons on the other end)
seem to be, what occupies the vast middle ground? In between AI systems
that act as much like a tool as a hammer and fully autonomous AI systems
(including robots) that exhibit social valence, spans a vast and varied
landscape of human-AI interaction. In particular, humans develop AI
systems in a variety of contexts in order to either substitute for the role a
natural person would otherwise perform, or to enable more efficient widescale coordination of natural persons. For example, companies use AI
systems to fulfill the role of employees in certain circumstances,142 to

138. Legal Protection for Social Robots, supra note 12, at 224.
139. IAN R. KERR, JASON MILLAR & NOEL CORRIVEAU, Robots and Artificial Intelligence in
Health Care, in CANADIAN HEALTH LAW AND POLICY 269 (Joanna Erdman, Vanessa Gruben & Erin
Nelson eds., 5th ed. 2017) (citing PETER H. KAHN, AIMEE L. REICHERT, HEATHER E. GARY,
TAKAYUKI KANDA, HIROSHI ISHIGURO, SOLACE SHEN, JOLINA H. RUCKERT & BRIAN GILL, THE NEW
ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY HYPOTHESIS IN HUMAN-ROBOT INTERACTION 159 (2011),
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/6281274 (last visited Nov. 28, 2021)).
140. A term coined by Professor Ryan Calo, “social valence” refers to the fact that robots “evoke
responses in people” similar to the responses they have to other people. Calo, Robotics, supra note
41, at 545.
141. Zimmerman, supra note 23, at 39 (“Computers have also been considered a ‘hybrid social
person’ when computers work with human beings in forming contracts and as a temporary status
granted for convenience, but not as conscious beings deserving of protection.” (footnotes omitted)).
Notably, Tom Allen and Robin Widdison use the term hybrid social person to refer to a partnership
between humans and computers. Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 25, 40 (1996). Here, that type of partnership may be said to exist for fully
autonomous but not sentient AI insofar as narrow AI is developed by, for a purpose determined by,
and used at the hands of, humans. See Reyes & Ward, supra note 32, at 349–50. This fits with Allen
and Widdison’s approach to granting legal personhood, in which ultimately, they determine that
granting legal personhood to entities that are capable of automatic action makes sense. Allen &
Widdison, supra, at 52.
142. See Mihailis E. Diamantis, The Extended Corporate Mind: When Corporations Use AI to
Break the Law, 98 N.C. L. REV. 893, 900 (2020) (providing examples that include using self-driving
cars instead of taxi or delivery drivers, replacing human bankers with algorithms that approve
mortgages, using algorithms instead of people to price products, among others).
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assist in the hiring process, 143 and to provide services. 144 Governments (a
collection of natural people) use AI systems to make benefits
determinations,145 assess recidivism risk,146 and predict neighborhoods in
need of higher levels of policing,147 among other things.148 Each of these
uses illustrate instances of humans working through AI systems. While
some of these uses may fall closer to the AI systems as tools end of the AI
personhood spectrum, at a certain point, the AI system becomes more than
just a tool and, instead, acts as a substitute or conduit for the actions of
natural people. To date, nowhere is this transition clearer than in the
autonomous corporate personhood context.149 While some corporations
use AI systems as tools for what is otherwise a very traditional business,
other corporations use AI systems and algorithmic systems to coordinate
human activity more efficiently, with less overhead and hierarchy, while
others allow the AI system to run the business almost entirely.150 Thus,
while the middle of the AI personhood spectrum might experience
gradations that make the AI system more like a tool, or more like a hybrid
social person, in certain circumstances the AI system fits a separate
category altogether—AI system as conduit for human activity.
When it comes to AI systems, then, the spectrum of personhood might
be summarized as one that varies not only by levels of automation, but
also by context.151 On the one hand, an AI system that automates activity
without exerting any form of autonomous will is appropriately viewed as
property. In that context, some other natural or legal person uses the AI
system as a tool to automate activity for the benefit of the natural or legal
person, at the complete direction and discretion of the natural or legal
person. On the other end of the spectrum, nearly autonomous AI systems
represent a form of hybrid social person—one which acts with social

143. Jason R. Bent, Is Algorithmic Affirmative Action Legal?, 108 GEO. L.J. 803, 809 (2020).
144. For example, financial firms provide investment advice through robo-advisors. Tom Baker &
Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV.
713, 713 (2018).
145. Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparency and Algorithmic Governance, 71 ADMIN. L.
REV. 1, 9 (2019).
146. Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the Criminal
Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1368 (2018).
147. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 145, at 7; Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and
Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 261 (2012).
148. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 145, at 7–9.
149. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 451–52.
150. Id. at 468; see also infra section III.B.
151. The emphasis on context differentiates this approach (and the ASQ method) from other
proposals to place AI agents and robots on a spectrum of personhood. For a different approach to
creating an AI spectrum, see generally Cofone, supra note 134.
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valence but is not endowed with characteristics normally associated with
natural persons. And in the vast space in between, where AI-related
technologies act as a conduit for collective human action, there seems to
be little to no discussion of whether the automated substitute carries
forward the personhood attributes of the human.
In other words, even the answer to the basic question of whether an AI
system needs legal personhood recognition varies along a spectrum of
social context. Further, even when legal personhood seems necessary, the
nature and extent of the rights and duties that society needs to attach to
personhood status varies.152 For example, AI systems as property do not
need their own personhood status unless bestowing some low level of
fictional personhood is the only way to ensure the owner remains liable
for wrongs committed while using the AI system.153 In the context of the
hybrid social person at the other end of the spectrum, the chief policy
drivers seem to be protection of the humans with which the robots interact.
Thus, the chief proposal for personhood in that setting is some form of
restricted personhood (person for liability purposes, or to protect social
values). AI systems used to substitute for or as conduits through which
humans or other legal persons act, however, represent the most likely
candidates for assigning a form of legal personhood with a significant
bundle of rights and duties attached. Indeed, this middle group poses the
most complicated questions around artificial personhood. When should a
natural person be required to “give up” her rights, or when can she claim
she has offloaded her duties, because of reliance on an AI system as a
conduit for action? Does the answer change if the AI system acts as a
conduit for a legal person? Despite these and other questions, this middle
group of AI systems remains the most under analyzed in the literature.
Because this middle group features prominently among autonomous
businesses, autonomous corporate personhood represents a unique
opportunity for exploring the contours of artificial personhood.

152. Several scholars point out that this is true for many areas in which the law recognizes
personhood. Banteka, supra note 26, at 551–53; Bryson et al., supra note 31, at 280–81; Susanna K.
Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood
Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 99–100 (2009) [hereinafter Ripken, Corporations Are
People Too] (“Because of the meaning and value we attach to personhood in our society, deciding
whether a corporation is a person helps us decide what its rights and duties are and how we can expect
it to behave. It gives us a normative framework for how we should view corporations, how they should
be treated, and how they should treat us.”); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal
Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655, 656 (1926) (“In saying that ‘person’ might legally mean whatever the
law makes it mean, I am trying to say that ‘person’ might be used simply as a synonym for a rightand-duty-bearing-unit.”).
153. Diamantis, supra note 142, at 900 (“[T]he law could and should recognize that corporate
minds extend to algorithms fulfilling roles that were once occupied only by human employees.”).
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Theories of Artificial Personhood as Applied to Autonomous
Corporations

The review of the AI personhood literature demonstrates that
technological artifacts, such as AI systems, can be typified as falling into
one of three main categories of personhood: (1) non-person property,
(2) personhood by virtue of acting as a conduit for humans, and (3) some
form of hybrid social person. The literature also makes clear that the
socio-legal needs driving these personhood categories include protecting
the rights of natural people, upholding social values, and creating a fiction
for legal convenience. Meanwhile, the ABR Taxonomy reveals the
imminent reality that the corporate form will act as a social context for AI
systems, and that this imminent social context comes in many varied
designs. These revelations together raise the question of whether and how
the existing theories of personhood for AI systems map to existing types
of autonomous businesses, and whether they can help fill the gaps in the
autonomous business literature. In particular, how well do the socio-legal
needs driving AI personhood map to those of autonomous corporations, if
at all? As explained in detail below, examining the three categories of AI
systems personhood through the prism of the ABR Taxonomy reveals
rough corollaries between theories of AI personhood and categories of
autonomous businesses, including corollaries in the socio-legal needs of
both.154 Unpacking each of these corollaries requires considering the
function played by autonomous technology in each category of businesses
in the ABR Taxonomy.
Taking Traditional Plus corporations first, such corporations use
autonomous technology in one of two ways—either to automate some
element of business operations in order to increase efficiencies and take
advantage of economies of scale, or to reduce overhead costs by
eliminating one or more layers of middle management.155 Such uses may
involve creating or otherwise acquiring proprietary software, hardware, or
other machinery and infrastructure.156 But generally speaking, Traditional
Plus companies view their use of the technology as mere use of
technological tools in the routine process of running a business. The
autonomous robots in Amazon’s warehouses represent equipment
employed in carrying out Amazon’s business to the same extent that the
packaging material that the robots move around the warehouses are

154. In this regard, I consider an autonomous business a specific type of AI system. For a general
definition of system, see RITTER, supra note 16, at 132–33.
155. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 473–74.
156. Id.

Reyes (Do Not Delete)

2021]

12/14/2021 10:00 PM

AUTONOMOUS CORPORATE PERSONHOOD

1483

equipment for use in the business.157 As a result, there is a strong
connection between the Traditional Plus corporation socio-contextual use
of AI and the approach to AI systems as corporate property.
In the case of Distributed Business Entities, on the other hand,
autonomous technologies become more integrated with the collective
activity of natural persons.158 Indeed, without the autonomous technology
acting as a coordinating and incentivizing device, the natural persons
involved in Distributed Business Entities could not collaborate to their
mutually productive economic ends. Instead of relying on all the trappings
of the traditional corporate form, Distributed Business Entities replace
some elements with technology that serves the same function.159 For
example, Distributed Business Entities seek to replace directors with more
direct shareholder governance, using the technology as a coordinating
device, rather than hierarchy.160 When AI systems act as conduits for
natural persons the AI personhood literature is less developed in terms of
assessing the nature and extent of personhood for the AI system. The AI
system clearly takes action that moves beyond mere property, such as
autonomous governance, autonomous compliance, and autonomous
performance of obligations among the natural persons for whom it acts as
a coordinating device. And yet, AI systems acting as conduits for natural
persons cannot be said to operate emergently or to always act on their
environment of their own accord such that they move into the realm of
socially valent AI systems.161 The result, contrary to most AI personhood
literature, is for the law to retain the human touch points firmly rooted as
part of the socio-contextual needs of Distributed Business Entities.
Autonomous Entities, with very few or no connections to natural
persons, bear the most resemblance to the technical artifacts discussed in
AI personhood literature as “robots.” Autonomous Entities, analogous to
the prevailing definition of robot,162 exist in a digital environment, can
sense that environment, process information from its environment, and
make changes to its environment.163 In the case of a Fully Autonomous
entity called Metronome, for example, Metronome sets the price of its
157. Id. at 463 (citing Will Knight, Inside Amazon’s Warehouse, Human-Robot Symbiosis, MIT
TECH. REV. (July 7, 2015), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/538601/inside-amazonswarehouse-human-robot-symbiosis/ [https://perma.cc/T26C-4XG9]).
158. Id. at 474–75.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 479.
161. Id. at 474 (describing The DAO and Dash as two examples of highly automated technology
coordinating economic activity, and yet requiring human input to actually take action).
162. Calo, Robotics, supra note 41, at 529–31.
163. Id. at 531 (“My working assumption is that a system acts upon its environment to the extent
it changes that environment directly.”).
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product by sensing and processing market signals related to customer
demand and pricing preferences.164 When customers pay the set price,
Metronome acts upon its environment by making state changes reflecting
the exchange of value between the Metronome customer and the
Metronome smart contracts.165 Although Metronome does not possess a
physical instantiation that can affect the physical world, which is often
considered a hallmark of robots (as compared to other AI systems), it can
autonomously impact the environment mutually shared by both
Metronome and its customer, which, in turn, can have real world
impacts.166 As a result, Metronome, and other Autonomous Entities, can
be said to “be in some way”167 that is markedly different from the mere
technology tools used to automate certain business functions by
Traditional Plus businesses, or the AI systems acting as conduits for
collective human activity in Distributed Business Entities.
When addressing the potential of bestowing personhood upon robots,
policy makers and scholars put some emphasis on the fact that robots
possess a heightened level of social valence—meaning, robots are more
likely to be treated as a social agent, like a person or a pet.168 While there
is no sense in which Autonomous Entities will be related to a person or a
pet, when Autonomous Entities are formed as corporations,169 they
assume the social valence of corporations.170 Corporations, autonomous

164. METRONOME, OWNER’S MANUAL 9, 11 (2018), https://metronome.io/download/owners_
manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/485H-N47Y] (explaining the descending price auctions).
165. Id. at 23–24.
166. Calo, Robotics, supra note 41, at 531 (“A robot in the strongest, fullest sense of the term exists
in the world as a corporeal object with the capacity to exert itself physically. But again, I am talking
in terms of a continuum.”).
167. Id. (emphasis omitted) (“A technology does not act, and hence is not a robot, merely by
providing information in an intelligible format. It must be in some way.” (emphasis in original)).
168. See generally, e.g., Legal Protection for Social Robots, supra note 12, at 214 (“People are
prone to anthropomorphism; that is, we project our own inherent qualities onto other entities to make
them seem more human-like. Our well-documented inclination to anthropomorphically relate to
animals translates remarkably well to robots.”); KERR ET AL., supra note 139, at 269 (“One novel
form of sociotechnical influence is that robots and AIs tend to have ‘social valence’. . . . [S]ocial
robots are often designed to promote ‘anthropomorphism’—the psychological tendency to treat
inanimate objects as though they have human qualities—thus blurring the line between human and
instrument.” (footnote omitted)); Calo, Robotics, supra note 41, at 532 (“Finally, robots, more so than
other technology in our lives, have a social valence. They feel different to us, more like living agents.
The effect is so systematic that a team of prominent psychologists and engineers has argued for a new
ontological category for robots somewhere between object and agent.” (emphasis in original)
(footnote omitted)).
169. LoPucki, supra note 21, at 906.
170. Social valence, by way of reminder, is the quality of an artificial entity (like robots and
corporations) to be perceived as more than an object, but as a social agent, like a person. Calo,
Robotics, supra note 41, at 545–46.
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or otherwise, use a variety of tactics to receive societal perception and
acceptance as social agents. For example, corporations use corporate
social responsibility tactics to “try to convince us that they are good global
citizens: ‘brands take stands’ by engaging in cause philanthropy; CEOs of
prominent corporations tackle a variety of issues; and social values drive
marketing strategies for goods and services.”171 In that way, they retain
social valence even without a physical form that might invite people to
anthropomorphize them. When AI systems, like robots and Fully
Autonomous corporations, are built to have frequent and highly impactful
interactions with natural persons, AI personhood literature encourages
law to provide the AI systems some rights, but not the full panoply of
rights natural persons enjoy.172 Indeed, many AI personhood scholars urge
policy makers to give socially valent AI systems those rights needed to
protect the natural persons with whom they interact—protect them from
both the AI systems and from themselves.173 As hybrid social persons—a
system with some social valence but that does not have intrinsic
characteristics of natural persons—lawmakers should be willing to
heavily circumscribe the rights Fully Autonomous corporations and
Algorithmic Entities (should they ever exist) in order to protect the
consumers and other natural persons in society with whom the
corporations will act.
In sum, as detailed below in Table 2, Traditional Plus corporations use
AI systems as proprietary tools to automate operations and/or middle
management, Distributed Business Entities use AI systems as a conduit
for collective human activity, and Autonomous Entities share striking
similarities with emerging conceptions of an AI hybrid social person—an
entity with social valence but lacking characteristics of intrinsic
personhood.

171. Kishanthi Parella, Improving Human Rights Compliance in Supply Chains, 95 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 727, 727 (2019). And as scholars increasingly recognize that corporate activities impact a
variety of societal actors beyond shareholders, the literature increasingly calls for corporate law to
find mechanisms of incentivizing corporations to assume a broader range of responsibilities.
Kishanthi Parella, Protecting Third Parties in Contracts, 58 AM. BUS. L.J. 327, 334–35 (2021).
172. See supra section II.A.
173. See, e.g., Legal Protection for Social Robots, supra note 12, at 214 (arguing that the law should
treat robots more like animals in certain contexts where humans anthropomorphize robots as a tool
for discouraging certain bad human behavior).
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Table 2: Layering Artificial Personhood Theories and the
ABR Taxonomy
Traditional Plus

Distributed Business
Entities

Autonomous Entities

Property

Conduit for Humans

Hybrid Social Person

1

2

3

4

5

6

Primarily
Operationally
Automated

Managerial
Automation
Light

Autonomous
Mediating
Hierarchy

Mostly
Autonomous

Fully Autonomous

Algorithmic
Entities

Because autonomous corporations exist at the intersection of AI
systems and corporations, a second layer of personhood theory must be
examined. Indeed, a complete understanding of the socio-legal needs of
autonomous corporations cannot be understood without considering how
the corporate personhood doctrine applies to the three categories of the
ABR Taxonomy and how they interact with the related AI personhood
theories.
III. EXPLORING THE CONTOURS OF AUTONOMOUS
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD THROUGH CORPORATE LAW
Because autonomous corporations meld two technologies—an AI
system and the corporate form—a consideration of autonomous corporate
personhood cannot rest in the AI personhood literature alone. As a result,
the socio-legal needs of corporations must figure just as prominently in an
approach to autonomous corporate personhood as those of AI systems. To
that end, this Part first reviews the corporate personhood literature and
discusses the three key theories that dominate the debates. As with the AI
personhood literature, this Part then views the corporate personhood
doctrine through the prism of the ABR Taxonomy, asking whether and to
which extent each theory tracks the reality of each type of autonomous
corporation. Ultimately, the exercise demonstrates that the question posed
by the Personless Corporation for decades—whether a singular approach
to corporate personhood makes sense in all circumstances—should be
answered in the negative. When the socio-technical context of
autonomous corporations collides with corporate personhood, no one
theory neatly fits each corporation. Rather, the appropriate theory for each
varies with the way the corporation puts the technology to use and the
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relative separation between ownership and control by natural persons.
A.

Corporate Personality and the Corporate Rights Conundrum

Notably, the corporate personality174 and corporate rights literature
reflects a conundrum analogous to that of the AI personhood conundrum.
Law first recognized corporations as artificial persons via the idea of
“legal personality” for private law convenience.175 Only people can
contract, sue, and be sued, own property, and enter into contracts, among
other things, so legally recognizing corporations as “people” simplified
commercial transactions, questions of liability, and the application of
other important regulations to corporate activity.176 But as foreshadowed
by the AI personhood debate, once deemed a person that can face liability
and regulation, the next question becomes whether the technical artifactturned-artificial person, in this case the corporation,177 should also bear
rights.
The United States Constitution does not specifically refer to
corporations.178 Yet corporations have pressed constitutional claims to
protect property, contract, and other rights specifically granted to persons

174. By way of reminder, corporate personhood scholars often use the term corporate personhood
to refer to the binary issue of whether a corporation should be treated as a person, while the term
corporate personality refers to the specific theories of personhood and the legal consequences
(including constitutional rights) that flow from a decision to treat a corporation as a person. See
Padfield, Does Corporate Personhood Matter, supra note 119, at 1010 & n.3; Padfield, A New Social
Contract, supra note 119, at 372.
175. Dewey, supra note 152, at 668 (“When it is difficult to lay hands on the single persons who
are said to be the only ‘real’ persons, it is very convenient to do business as a fiction.”).
176. Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1637–38.
177. The corporate form, a creature of state law, is a form of technology, and as such, is as much a
technical artifact as an AI system. See John O. McGinnis & Steven Wasick, Law’s Algorithm, 66 FLA.
L. REV. 991, 991 (2014). As McGinnis explains, “[l]aw thus works necessarily in part as an
information technology—a tool for the distribution of information to the world that may itself change
through the infusion of more information from the world.” Id. at 993. Further,
[h]umans are both creators and creatures of technology. Everything we do is vitally connected
to the tools we develop, and the law is no different. Law itself is in part a tool and an information
technology, but its effectiveness depends on the larger domain of material technologies in which
it nests.
Id. at 1000.
178. Blair & Pollman, supra note 18, at 1680; see also Pollman, Corporate Privacy, supra note 17,
at 44–45 (“The U.S. Constitution does not specifically mention corporations. As a matter of
constitutional text, no explanation is provided regarding the application of constitutional provisions
to corporations.” (citing ASHUTOSH BHAGWAT, THE MYTH OF RIGHTS: THE PURPOSES AND LIMITS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 10–15 (2010))); Susanna Kim Ripken, Citizens United, Corporate
Personhood, and Corporate Power: The Tension Between Constitutional Law and Corporate Law, 6
U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 285, 288 (2012) (“[O]ver the last 125 years, the Supreme Court
has held corporations are persons entitled to numerous constitutional protections, even though the
word ‘corporation’ does not appear anywhere in the Constitution.”).
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and citizens under the Constitution since as early as 1809.179 Legal
scholars have struggled for more than a century with the questions of
whether and to what extent corporations should carry the rights and
responsibilities of persons.180 At present, a corporation enjoys
constitutionally protected rights to enter into contracts,181 own property,182
enjoy due process protections under the Fifth Amendment,183 be free from

179. Blair & Pollman, supra note 18, at 1680 (“The Supreme Court faced one of its earliest tasks
of interpreting how a constitutional provision applies to corporations in the 1809 case Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux.”).
180. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 152, at 99 (citing ERNST FREUND, THE
LEGAL NATURE OF CORPORATIONS (1897); FREDERICK HALLIS, CORPORATE PERSONALITY: A
STUDY IN JURISPRUDENCE (1930); H.L.A. HART, DEFINITION AND THEORY IN JURISPRUDENCE: AN
INAUGURAL LECTURE (1953); ALEXANDER NÉKÁM, THE PERSONALITY CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL
ENTITY (1938); S.J. STOLJAR, GROUPS AND ENTITIES: AN INQUIRY INTO CORPORATE THEORY
(1973); George F. Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Corporate Entity Theory, 17 COLUM. L. REV.
128 (1917); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809 (1935); John Finnis, Corporate Persons II: Persons and Their Associations, in 63 SUPP.
VOL.: PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 267 (1989); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of Corporate
Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932); Paul Vinogradoff, Juridical Persons, 24 COLUM. L. REV.
594 (1924); Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. REV. 494 (1938)) (“Whether
or not the corporation should be viewed as a separate person that owes and is owed certain obligations
has puzzled theorists for years.”); Virginia Harper Ho, Theories of Corporate Groups: Corporate
Identity Reconceived, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 879, 891 (2012) (“Since the advent of the corporate
form, the extent to which corporations should bear the same rights and duties as individuals has
engaged corporate law scholars and the courts.”).
181. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 650 (1819).
182. Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394–95 (1886) (explaining that
corporations are persons under the Fourteenth Amendment and can own property); see also Pollman,
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1643 (“The focus was on property rights: ‘The
trust cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of protecting property rights, the property of all business
and trading corporations IS the property of the individual corporators.’” (citation omitted)). Several
scholars have prominently argued that, in fact, early corporate personhood jurisprudence was entirely
focused on the protection of contract and property rights of corporations. See generally, e.g., Pollman,
Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1630 (“Specifically, this Article traces
historical and theoretical developments in the corporation and corporate personhood jurisprudence to
show that the roots of the doctrine are based in concerns about the property and contract interests of
shareholders.”); Pollman, Corporate Privacy, supra note 17, at 46 (“In the later part of the nineteenth
century, the Court recognized equal protection and due process protections for corporations under the
Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments. The Court gave little explanation for these rulings, but justified
this extension of constitutional protection on the basis that it protected the property interests of the
people associating through the corporate form.” (citations omitted)); Blair & Pollman, supra note 18,
at 1695 (“These early cases recognizing corporations as holders of constitutional rights, or ‘persons’
under the Constitution, responded to questions about whether corporations should have the property
and contract rights and protections afforded to individuals.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical
Corporation in American Legal Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1641 (1988) (describing the United
States Supreme Court’s focus on the “problem [of] guaranteeing that the owners of property held in
the name of a corporation would receive the same constitutional protections as the owners of property
held in their own name.”).
183. Noble v. Union River Logging R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 165, 176 (1893).
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unreasonable search and seizure,184 enjoy equal protection of the laws,185
freely express itself through speech—including using monetary spending
as political speech,186—and express religious beliefs,187 among others.188
Throughout its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court jumps between several
corporate personality theories as justification for imbuing the corporation
with specific constitutional rights.189 Scholars, in turn, remain frustrated,
fascinated, and altogether perplexed by the apparent lack of a unified
theory underlying the Supreme Court’s decisions, resulting in a rich and
extensive literature around the doctrine of corporate personhood.190 Three
theories of corporate personhood dominate the debate in the literature and

184. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 70–71 (1906) (holding corporations have a Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable searches and seizures, but not a Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination).
185. Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396 (noting that the Court agreed that the Equal Protection Clause
applied to corporations).
186. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010).
187. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 706–07 (2014) (explaining that free
exercise includes protection of the religious liberties of the individual natural persons who own and
control those companies).
188. Other such constitutional amendments include Fifth Amendment protections for liberty and
against double jeopardy. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1977)
(discussing double jeopardy); Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 969
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing liberty interests under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
Arguably, they also include the Seventh Amendment right to trial by jury. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S.
531, 532–34 (1970). For a further discussion of corporate constitutional rights in the criminal law
context, see Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805 (2005); and V.S.
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477
(1996). Some debate exists as to whether a right to privacy should be included in this list as well.
Compare Pollman, Corporate Privacy, supra note 17, at 27, 88 (arguing that no constitutionally
protected right to privacy has yet been extended to corporations by the Supreme Court and that no
such right should be extended except in certain limited circumstances), with LoPucki, supra note 21,
at 890–91, 891 n.12 (citing Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) for the
proposition that corporations enjoy “a reasonable, legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy
within the interior of its covered buildings, and it is equally clear that expectation is one society is
prepared to observe”).
189. Chatman, supra note 18, at 817 (“The Court has never explained the source of corporate
constitutional rights or settled on a single theory of the nature of the corporate form.” (citing ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 257 (2014))); Pollman, Reconceiving
Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1649 (“In so holding, the Court oscillated between reasoning
based on the concession, aggregate and real entity views, balancing the recognition that
‘[c]orporations are a necessary feature of modern business activity,’ with the sense that the state that
creates the corporation must preserve its ability to regulate.”).
190. See, e.g., Jess M. Krannich, The Corporate “Person”: A New Analytical Approach to a
Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation, 37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 61, 62 (2005) (“As a matter of
law, the Court’s jurisprudence relating to corporate constitutional rights is fundamentally flawed.”);
Chatman, supra note 18, at 812 (“When courts issue decisions that define corporate rights without
first defining the corporate person, they may unintentionally alter what it means to be a corporation.”).
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appear to underly Supreme Court decisions:191 the artificial entity (or
concession) theory, the aggregate theory, and the real entity theory.192
This Article does not purport to survey the entire landscape of corporate
personhood jurisprudence and scholarly literature, as others have already
spectacularly undertaken that project.193 The aim of this brief overview,
instead, is to provide enough of a summary of the corporate personhood
debate to get a sense of the jurisprudential needs that the doctrine fills.
The artificial entity theory, also called the concession theory,194 “views
the corporation as a tremendous capital accumulation device that was only
made possible by the state conveying certain privileges to incorporators
for which they could not otherwise privately contract.”195 In other words,
the artificial entity theory views the corporation as a fictional entity
created by natural persons at the pleasure of the state; the corporation only
exists because a state statute enables it to exist.196 From a socio-legal
191. Stefan J. Padfield, The Silent Role of Corporate Theory in the Supreme Court’s Campaign
Finance Cases, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 831, 834 (2013) [hereinafter Padfield, Silent Role of Corporate
Theory] (arguing that corporate theory plays a role in Supreme Court jurisprudence on corporate
constitutional rights even when the Court does not explicitly state as much in its opinions).
192. Padfield, A New Social Contract, supra note 119, at 373 (“The three primary theories of
corporate personality are: (1) artificial entity theory (also known as concession theory); (2) aggregate
theory; and (3) real entity theory.”); Chatman, supra note 18, at 819 (identifying “the major theories
of corporate personhood” as “the artificial entity/concession theory, aggregate theory, or real entity
theory”); S.I. Strong, Congress and Commercial Trusts: Dealing with Diversity Jurisdiction PostAmericold, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1021, 1057 (2017) (identifying “the three traditional theories of corporate
personhood” as “the concession theory, the aggregate theory, and the real entity theory”); Martin
Petrin, Reconceptualizing the Theory of the Firm—From Nature to Function, 118 PA. ST. L. REV. 1,
1 (2013). Other theories of the corporation include nexus-of-contracts theory, process theory, directorprimacy theory, team-production theory, and systems theory. See Padfield, Silent Role of Corporate
Theory, supra note 191, at 835 (citing ROBERT W. HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, BLACK LETTER
OUTLINES: CORPORATIONS 327–32 (5th ed. 2006)); Tamara Belinfanti & Lynn Stout, Contested
Visions: The Value of Systems Theory for Corporate Law, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2018)
(detailing a systems theory of corporations). One way to distinguish between the various theories is
to see the artificial theory, aggregate theory, and real entity theory as constitutional theories of the
corporation, while the others listed above represent corporate governance theories of the corporation.
Stefan J. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 327, 330–31 (2014).
193. For deeper review of the Supreme Court corporate personhood jurisprudence, see generally
Blair & Pollman, supra note 18; Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11;
Chatman, supra note 18; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate
Form: A Historical Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 767 (2005);
Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV.
173 (1985); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201; Michael J. Phillips,
How Much Does Corporate Theory Matter? A Response to Professor Boatright, 34 AM. BUS. L.J.
239 (1996); ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN BUSINESSES WON THEIR
CIVIL RIGHTS (2018); RIPKEN, supra note 129.
194. Padfield, A New Social Contract, supra note 119, at 373 (noting both terms are used).
195. Padfield, Rehabilitating Concession Theory, supra note 192, at 332.
196. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 152, at 100; Chatman, supra note 18, at
811.
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needs perspective, the artificial entity theory might be seen as calling on
states to regulate corporations in order to protect natural persons197
because “[t]he laws that create corporations should shape them to act in
ways that serve the public interest.”198
The aggregate theory, for its part, views the corporation as a collection
of the people who own the corporation, and who, by their ownership,
practically enable the corporation to function.199 Under the aggregate
theory, corporations derive their constitutional rights from the association
of individual shareholders.200 The idea is that individual shareholders each
enjoy rights and the shareholders do not surrender those rights merely by
associating with others through the corporate form. Thus, the corporation
may exert the individual rights of the shareholders as though those rights
flow through to the corporate entity.201 From a socio-legal needs
perspective, the aggregate theory appears to prioritize the protection of the
rights of the individuals comprising the corporation.202
Under the real entity theory, the corporation “is an independent reality
that exists as an objective fact and has a real presence in society.”203 Under
this view, the corporation stands alone, as “an entity unto itself, untethered
from its founders, shareholders, and management. The people associated
with the corporation are agents, investors, or lenders; they do not define
the corporation.”204 It is not entirely clear what socio-legal needs drive the
197. Padfield, A New Social Contract, supra note 119, at 373 (“Concession theory, on the other
hand, views the corporation as a state creation, and presumes the state may regulate its creation as it
sees fit.”).
198. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 152, at 101 (“Viewing the corporation as a
creature of statute and a product of state action supports a public-oriented view of corporations and
corporate law.”).
199. Id. at 100–01 (“Others argue that the corporation is not so much a creature of law as it is an
association forged by the mutual agreement of the individuals composing it. . . . Therefore, the
corporation is better described as a collection, or aggregate, of its individual human constituents,
without whom the corporation would have no identity or ability to function at all.”); Chatman, supra
note 18, at 822 (“Chief Justice Marshall’s view of the corporation also included the aggregate theory,
which views the corporation’s rights as indistinguishable from the rights of the people who make up
and own the corporation—shareholders.”).
200. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 18, at 1677.
201. Chatman, supra note 18, at 822. The capacity for corporations to assert derivative
constitutional rights of its owners is not without limits. See Blair & Pollman, supra note 18, at 1690–
91, 1727–28.
202. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 152, at 102.
203. Id. at 101.
204. Chatman, supra note 18, at 823; see also Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law
After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 8–9 (2015) (“[C]orporations own property, enter into contracts,
and commit torts. They can sue and be sued in their own right. They are subject to penalties if they
violate applicable criminal laws. They must comply with a vast array of federal and state
regulations. . . . [T]hey are subject to income tax liability on the net income generated by their
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real entity theory of the corporation. On the one hand, adopting a real
entity theory of the corporation may create a need to give the corporation
the same rights and responsibilities as natural persons.205 On the other
hand, a separate existence of a corporation from the people within it may
make it easier to acknowledge that corporations are quite different from
natural persons,206 and the unique character of corporations may demand
different approaches to corporate rights determinations than that used with
natural persons.207
Although scholars and Supreme Court justices alike often represent
these three theories of the corporation as though they exist in isolation,
many commentators note that the corporate reality never fits neatly into
just one theory.208 This reality makes the debate over corporate personality
theories difficult to mediate.209 Indeed, scholars explain that the extremely
varied nature of corporate structures makes it difficult to map out a
taxonomy of corporations and, therefore, to create a systematic
framework for corporate rights determinations that gives sufficient space
to corporate diversity.210 In other words, the apparent haphazardness of
the Supreme Court’s approach to corporate personhood is intimately
related to the socio-contextual complexity of the corporation’s role in
society.
Like the spectrum of AI personhood theories, the corporate personhood
commercial activities. . . . [T]he rights and obligations of corporations are not simply those of their
shareholders, officers, directors, employees, or other humans who participate in or are affected by the
corporation’s activities.”); Oliver Weinstein, The Current State of the Economic Theory of the Firm,
in THE FIRM AS AN ENTITY: IMPLICATIONS FOR ECONOMICS, ACCOUNTING, AND THE LAW 21, 33
(Yuri Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat eds., 2007) (“The firm exists in its own right, as a
specific entity, beyond the changing personalities of shareholders, workers and managers.”).
205. Ripkin, Corporations Are People Too, supra note 152, at 102.
206. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 1 ACCT., ECON. & L. 1, 41–
42 (2011) (“The entire Citizens United opinion, both the majority and the dissent, are thus reflective
of the real entity view. Corporations stand on their own, independent of both the state that created
them and the shareholders that own them. The debate between the majority and the dissent is about
what follows from this perspective on corporations. In the majority’s opinion, this means that
corporations are speakers just like individuals and entitled to the same First Amendment
protection . . . .”).
207. Id. at 42 (“[T]he dissent takes the view that because of the special characteristics of
corporations, they have more limited First Amendment rights.”).
208. Chatman, supra note 18, at 818 (“The corporation is a real, stand-alone entity, independent of
the natural persons who form and operate it. But it is also an artificial entity with rights that are defined
and limited by the choices its creators made when adopting the state’s terms.”); Ripken, Corporations
Are People Too, supra note 152, at 102 (“[T]he corporation is a multi-dimensional person with
coinciding and conflicting properties that defy classification into a neat and tidy unitary theory. The
modern corporation simply cannot be understood apart from the broader context in which it functions,
and that context cannot be effectively analyzed without multiple academic perspectives.”).
209. Chatman, supra note 18, at 853.
210. Id. at 845.
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theories seek to protect participants in the corporation from losing their
individual rights while also enabling regulation that holds corporations
accountable to society at large. Further, corporate personhood serves a
convenience function, allowing the corporation to sue, be sued, contract,
and participate in commerce more easily. Viewed this way, the goals of
AI personhood and corporate personhood do not appear that dissimilar:
protecting the rights of natural people, upholding social values, and
creating a fiction for legal convenience. Further, the appropriateness of
using any given personhood theory for either AI systems or corporations
appears to turn on the social context of each. Autonomous corporations—
the intersection of AI systems and corporations—enable a deeper
exploration of the potential links between the socio-technical reality of AI
systems and the socio-contextual complexity of corporations. This, in
turn, helps frame an approach to legal personhood for AI systems in a
specific social context—autonomous business.
B.

Corporate Rights and the Theories of Corporate Personality as
Applied to Autonomous Corporations

Just as the AI personhood literature offered three rough theories of
thinking about AI systems as persons,211 the corporate personhood
literature just discussed reveals three core theories: aggregate, real, and
artificial entity theories of corporate personhood. Because viewing AI
personhood through the prism of autonomous corporations revealed
certain theoretical gaps, the question becomes whether corporate
personhood doctrine can fill the gaps. Answering that question requires
considering the application of each corporate personhood theory to the
socio-contextual complexity of the ABR Taxonomy.
Starting with the aggregate theory, many scholars disfavor the
aggregate theory of the corporation because, in their view, corporate
reality no longer supports such a view.212 As management became
211. See supra section II.A.
212. See, e.g., Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, supra note 11, at 1662 (“The
aggregate view offers the advantage of explaining why corporations should have constitutional
protections because it recognizes that human actors exist behind the corporation. But like the
concession view, the aggregate view can be incongruent with modern times, at least in the large
company context where it is not clear whose rights are being protected and what the scope of those
rights should be.”); Blair & Pollman, supra note 18, at 1678–79 (“By about 1910, a sizable class of
very large, branded, publicly traded corporations had emerged, and for these entities, it was no longer
credible that they would be seen as proxies for the interests of a well-defined and identifiable group
of individual investors or other participants. Although there might have been some matters in which
such a corporation could appropriately be viewed as representing the aggregate interests of its
investors (or perhaps of its managers, employees, or customers), in many matters, its interests could
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increasingly separated from ownership in the early twentieth century, the
idea that a corporation owes its existence to an association of individual
owners became more attenuated.213 This commentary applies to Primarily
Operationally Automated Businesses, which are essentially traditional
corporations that simply automated some element in their product or
service chain.214 The sharing economy215 companies that often stand out
as Managerial Automation Light corporations further support claims that
some modern corporations no longer represent an association of
individuals.216 Rather, the whole point of automation for many Managerial
Automation Light corporations is to replace the traditional association of
persons with a peer-to-peer network of un-associated persons.217 As a
result, when considering the nature of both types of Traditional Plus
corporations, neither fits the aggregate theory of corporate personhood.
Traditional Plus corporations do, on the other hand, exhibit
characteristics of both an artificial entity and a real entity.218 First, these
corporations, whether part of the Sharing Economy or otherwise, exist
because they incorporated according to the requirements of state law, and
not be clearly identified with any particular group of individuals.”); LISA M. FAIRFAX, SHAREHOLDER
DEMOCRACY: A PRIMER ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM AND PARTICIPATION 12 (2011) (“Although the
shareholder voting right has been described as fundamental, it is relatively limited. . . . State corporate
law provides that the board exercises most of the power and control within the corporation.”);
Greenfield, supra note 17, at 320 (“The notion of derivative standing is similarly
problematic. . . . First, as mentioned above, many corporate entities do not have shareholders. And
many corporations have only other corporations as shareholders.”); Elizabeth Pollman,
Constitutionalizing Corporate Law, 69 VAND. L. REV. 639, 676 (2016) (“Shareholders elect the board
of directors, but the shareholder franchise is not a device to aggregate the political, social, or religious
values of shareholders, nor is it often a deliberative or associational process.”).
213. See, e.g., Blair & Pollman, supra note 18, at 1709 (stating that by 1910 the U.S. economy was
dominated by giant corporations and observing that “[t]he new giant corporations were not just larger
than corporations had been in the nineteenth century, they were in many ways, qualitatively different.
They were no longer likely to be controlled by the founder or family of the founder, but were likely
to have hundreds, or even thousands of shareholders, who traded their shares in public securities
markets, and hundreds or thousands of employees.”).
214. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 476.
215. Although it is clear that a definitional debate persists in the literature regarding the Sharing
Economy, this Article borrows the definition of Sharing Economy used by Abbey Stemler, as follows:
“all businesses that utilize platforms to connect people who have goods and services to offer with
those who are willing to purchase them.” Stemler, supra note 76, at 199 n.12.
216. Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 101 MINN. L. REV. 87, 90 (2016) (describing the sharing
economy as “radically changing the traditional equilibria of supply and demand, blurring the lines
between owners and users, producers and consumers, workers and contractors, and transcending the
spatial divides of personal and professional, business and home, market and leisure, friend and client,
acquaintance and stranger, public and private”).
217. See generally Reyes, ABR, supra note 20.
218. Carliss Chatman refers to the recognition that aspects of both the artificial and real entity
theories are present in corporations as the “hybrid theory” of corporations. Chatman, supra note 18,
at 818.
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thus they enjoy the rights extended to them under state law.219 Second,
such corporations often achieve a presence that is undeniably greater than
the sum of its parts. For example, Amazon enjoys a certain persona as a
technology giant wielding significant levels of economic and social
power.220 In other words, society reacts to Amazon as though it is more
than the mere sum of its individual constituent parts—it is a real entity
acquiring real power and causing real impacts in society. Similarly, the
Sharing Economy companies exist as a real entity that is greater than the
sum of the participants in its platform. In fact, that separateness often
attracts negative attention.221 As scholars repeatedly proclaim,
corporations do not fit neatly into just one theory of corporate
personhood.222 Traditional Plus corporations are no different. In fact, they
are the type of corporation society accepts as commonplace now. As a
result, it should be unsurprising that corporate personhood for Traditional
Plus corporations fits within the two theories that consistently rotate in
prominence in Supreme Court decisions and scholarly discussions.223
Autonomous corporate personhood for Distributed Business Entities,
on the other hand, cannot be adequately explained by the artificial entity
theory because such corporations insufficiently rely upon the state’s
power to ensure limited liability, capital lock-in, perpetual existence, and
the other characteristics of the corporation commonly recited as the
concessions individuals seek through incorporation.224 In fact, the
219. Id. at 812.
220. See, e.g., Nizan Geslevich Packin, Too-Big-to-Fail 2.0? Digital Service Providers as CyberSocial Systems, 93 IND. L.J. 1211, 1215–16 (2018) (arguing Amazon and other massive technology
companies should be viewed as Critical Service Providers); Paul Schiff Berman, Legal Jurisdiction
and the Deterritorialization of Data, 71 VAND. L. REV. 11, 12 (2018) (detailing how multinational
corporate data intermediaries, like Amazon, are increasingly asked by governmental and judicial
authorities to carry out and enforce their orders because of their status as technology giants wielding
significant power).
221. TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 10–11 (2015) (“[A]
new form of surveillance where service workers must live in fear of being snitched
on, . . . marketplaces are generating new and ever-more-entitled forms of consumption . . . [and]
many Sharing Economy companies are making big money for their investors and executives, and
making good jobs for their software engineers and marketers, by removing the protections and
assurances won by decades of struggle, by creating riskier and more precarious forms of low-paid
work for those who actually work in the Sharing Economy.”).
222. See, e.g., Chatman, supra note 18, at 824–25 (arguing that to adopt a position that actually
represents the nature of the corporate form, the Court should adopt a hybrid theory); Nelson, supra
note 118, at 1574–75 (explaining why each of the three prominent theories of corporate personhood
fail to adequately capture the nature of the corporation on their own).
223. Harper Ho, supra note 180, at 919; Avi-Yonah, supra note 206, at 1041.
224. John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Mariana Pargendler, What Is Corporate
Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1 (3d
ed. 2017); Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119
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technology that powers the corporations in Distributed Business Entities
endogenously provides these functions.225 This means that the entity
would stand alone and could be operated with many of the same properties
as a corporation prior to incorporation.226 Furthermore, Distributed
Business Entities enjoy perpetual life without relying on the corporate
form to provide it. These characteristics of operational and managerial
automation taken together clearly evoke the real entity theory.
Nevertheless, the technology powering Distributed Business Entities
also enables more democratic management-ownership structures.227 For
example, in the case of the Plantoid,228 although each individual artwork
is financially autonomous, the smart contract and blockchain technology
powering the Plantoid enables new forms of collective economic and
artistic structures for humans in art production.229 In other words,
increased managerial automation reverses the corporate trend of deep
separation between management and control.230 This flattening of the
management-ownership hierarchy enables a view of these hightechnology businesses as deeply connected to an association of natural
persons, despite the fact that those natural persons are often so dispersed
that they resemble shareholders of public corporations. As a result,
Distributed Business Entities can clearly be viewed as an association or
aggregation of natural persons.
Autonomous Entities, for their part, autonomously produce and sell a
HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1343 (2006); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of
Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 390 (2000).
225. Usha R. Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L. REV. 679, 714 (2019); Carla L.
Reyes, (Un)Corporate Crypto-Governance, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1875, 1901 (2020).
226. Rodrigues, supra note 225, at 714; Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 21, at 377–78.
227. Roger Aitken, After Facebook’s Data ‘Blow-Up’ Are DAOs Leveraging Blockchain’s
Future?, FORBES (Apr. 20, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogeraitken/2018/04/20/a
fter-facebooks-data-blow-up-are-daos-leveraging-blockchain-the-future/#f43ac5c3cefe
[https://perma.cc/7L5K-6K98] (“Decisions are made through the votes of token holders. There are no
boards of directors, C-level executives and management teams. Should changes need to be made to
the rules themselves, decisions are made through consensus. And, all transactions are recorded
transparently . . . on the blockchain . . . .”).
228. For a full explanation of the Plantoid, see Carla L. Reyes, Conceptualizing Cryptolaw, 96
NEB. L. REV. 384, 385–86 (2017); Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 468–69.
229. Elena Giulia Rossi, GAME OVER. Loading. Interview to Primavera De Filippi, ARSHAKE
(Jan. 21, 2021), https://www.arshake.com/en/game-over-loading-interview-to-primavera-de-filippi/
[https://perma.cc/PSJ5-2P6S] (“The Plantoid represents the beginning of a new relationship between
creators, their work, and the progeny of the work. Indeed, the underlying mechanisms for the
financing and reproduction of a Plantoid obviously clash with the traditional conception of copyright
law, which is based on the notion of scarcity and exclusivity. Instead of relying on exclusive rights in
order to prevent the reproduction and distribution of creative works, with a Plantoid, artists actually
have an incentive to maximize the dissemination and encourage the creation of derivative works,
because that is what will maximize their return on investment.” (emphasis in original)).
230. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 477–78.
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product and/or service, autonomously set the price of that product and/or
service, autonomously manage the venture, autonomously interact with
customers, and autonomously hold the proceeds of the business within
computer software itself. With only de minimis human involvement in
Fully Autonomous businesses and no human involvement in Algorithmic
Entities, Autonomous Entities cannot be viewed as an aggregation of
individual natural persons. There are no natural persons to aggregate.
Admittedly some natural person, whether a stand-alone software
developer, a disperse group of loosely coordinated open-source software
developers, or a software developer employed by a separate corporation
initially created the computer software program(s) that make Autonomous
Entities functional. However, when a person or corporation creates such
computer software, that person or corporation typically owns it.231 The
code can be copyrighted,232 and the architecture can be patented.233 Prior
to the creation of the autonomous corporation by state government fiat,
the computer software did not exist as an entity; at best, the software
existed as property or as a computer agent.234 As a result, fully automated
and ownerless autonomous businesses cannot be explained through the
lens of the real entity theory. Instead, such Autonomous Entities truly
exist solely because the state where it is incorporated allows it to exist. As
a result, Autonomous Entities embody the artificial entity theory.
In sum, and as visually depicted in Table 3, below, Traditional Plus
231. Sara Boettinger & Dan L. Burk, Open Source Patenting, 1 J. INT’L BIOTECH. L. 221, 222
(2004) (“Source code versions of a commercial program are typically kept proprietary and
undisclosed in order to hamper competitors from producing rival products. These commercial
products are closed source; their source code is unavailable and inaccessible.” (footnotes omitted)
(first citing Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON
L. REV. 843 (1994); and then citing Lawrence Lessig, The Limits in Open Code: Regulatory Standards
and the Future of the Net, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 759, 764–65 (1999))).
232. Admittedly, many in the blockchain space open source code, but even then, they do so under
an open-source license of their choice. See, e.g., Mark Radcliffe & Victoria Lee, Opinion, The Big
Legal Issue Blockchain Developers Rarely Discuss, COINDESK (Sept. 13, 2021, 1:21 AM),
https://www.coindesk.com/the-big-legal-issue-blockchain-developers-rarely-discuss
[https://perma.cc/8J5L-MYPE] (noting that “[open source licenses (OSS)] are used by both of the two
major public blockchains, ethereum and bitcoin, as well as many other major blockchain projects,
including the HyperLedger programs and R3’s Corda.”); James Gatto, 10 Lessons on Blockchain and
Open-Source Licenses, LAW360 (Nov. 1, 2018, 2:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/10976
62/10-lessons-on-blockchain-and-open-source-licenses [https://perma.cc/QB43-H7C9] (“Many
blockchain-based applications are licensed under open-source licenses.”).
233. Mark A. Lemley, Software Patents and the Return of Functional Claiming, 2013 WIS. L. REV.
905, 929 (“Even nominally open-source technologies may turn out to be subject to hundreds or
thousands of patents.”).
234. Koops et al., supra note 127, at 512 (discussing the notion of legal agency wherein “an agent
refers to an entity that is at work for somebody (or something) else” and referring to semi-autonomous
computer software as computer agents when they “act or interact with others on behalf of their
users/owners”).
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corporations display elements of a hybrid artificial and real entity view of
the corporation.235 Meanwhile, Distributed Business Entities fit a hybrid
aggregate and real entity theory of the corporation. Autonomous Entities,
for their part, find support only in the artificial entity theory of the
corporation. In other words, Autonomous Entities are the most artificial
on the spectrum of technical artifacts created by autonomous corporations.
Table 3: Corporate Personality Theories and the ABR Taxonomy
Traditional Plus

Distributed Business
Entities

Autonomous Entities

Real & Artificial Entity
Theories

Aggregate & Real Entity
Theories

Artificial Entity Theory

1

2

3

4

5

6

Primarily
Operationally
Automated

Managerial
Automation
Light

Autonomous
Mediating
Hierarchy

Mostly
Autonomous

Fully
Autonomous

Algorithmic
Entities

Creating a comprehensive approach to artificial personhood for
autonomous corporations as a specific socio-technical context now
requires combining the lessons from both AI personhood and corporate
personhood when applied to autonomous businesses.
IV. LESSONS FROM AUTONOMOUS CORPORATE
PERSONHOOD FOR BROADER DISCUSSIONS OF LAW
AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS
Having mapped the theories of AI personhood and corporate
personality to the ABR Taxonomy, this Part considers the intersection of
those two maps, laying out a multi-dimensional approach to autonomous
corporate personhood that moves the literature closer to capturing the
complexity of the field of existing autonomous businesses. This Part then
argues that this new Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum can
serve as a guide to policy makers and legal reformers trying to develop a
path for increasingly automated businesses to interact with the world.
More broadly, this Part argues that the entire methodology of the Article
can be used as a new approach to assessing which bundle of legal rights
and duties to bestow on different AI systems. In doing so, this Part calls

235. Chatman, supra note 18, at 854.
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for the legal community to consider where the important considerations
of socio-technical and socio-legal context of technology systems fit into
the principle of technology neutrality.
A.

Links Between Theories of AI Personhood and Corporate
Personhood Create an Autonomous Corporate Personhood
Spectrum

By layering AI personhood theories together with corporate
personhood theories, links between the two become apparent in the
autonomous corporate context. For Traditional Plus corporations, the
corporation owns AI systems and uses them to improve their business.236
Thus, any personhood attributed to Traditional Plus corporations must rest
solely on theories of corporate personhood, in this case the real and
artificial entity theories.237 Those theories both serve to enable the law to
impose responsibilities upon corporations that they could otherwise avoid
if they were not treated as a fictional legal person.238 Both theories also
empower law-makers to incentivize corporations to internalize certain
negative externalities caused by their business endeavors.239 Those
theories are also the basis for allowing corporations to enjoy certain rights
otherwise only enjoyed by humans;240 however, corporations do not enjoy
those rights automatically. Any such rights of speech or privacy must be
either given to corporations by statute or declared by the Supreme Court
to stem from constitutional principles.241 Distributed Business Entities, for
their part, can be supported most readily by AI personhood theories of AI
systems as conduits for humans and the aggregate and real entity theories
of the corporation. Here, the corporation and the AI system join to form
the Distributed Business Entity, such that the three theories jointly reflect
that the Distributed Business Entity is both a system separate from the
constituent natural persons that use it as a coordinating device and also an
actual aggregation of natural persons using their own collective agency to
make decisions. Lastly, Autonomous Entities are artificial hybrid social
236. See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 218–223 and accompanying text.
238. Padfield, New Social Contract, supra note 119, at 373; Ripken, Corporations Are People Too,
supra note 152, at 101.
239. RIPKEN, supra note 129, at 27 (stating that under the artificial person theory, “it is plausible
that legislative and judicial authorities could . . . justify limits on corporate activity” (citing Lyman
Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: Corporate Personhood,
35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1448–49 (2012))).
240. Avi-Yonah, supra note 206, at 41–42.
241. Chatman, supra note 18, at 812 (“Corporations are defined by state law, and have rights
incidental to that status. Corporations also have rights defined by statutes.”).
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persons. With no natural persons to run the business, Autonomous Entities
act in society as social agents but possess no intrinsic characteristics of
natural persons.
In sum, and as visually depicted below in Table 4, the corporations that
use AI systems as property—Traditional Plus corporations—really are not
that different from the corporations that have been the subject of corporate
personhood doctrine for centuries. The corporations that use AI systems
as a coordinating device for more direct control over corporate affairs,
however, embody the aggregate theory to a deeper extent than previously
thought possible in the corporate form.242 Indeed, less separation of
ownership and control makes reliance on the aggregate theory to justify
corporate personhood more consistent with the actual behavior of the
entity243 than when the aggregate theory is used for Traditional Plus
corporations.244 As a result, a strong need exists to protect the rights of the
natural persons involved in the autonomous corporation.245 Even so,
Distributed Business Entities do not lose their status as a real entity that
acts in the world merely because of their distributed nature.246 Rather,
although using AI systems as a conduit for the collective activity of
extremely distributed natural persons holds the potential to radically

242. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 17 (1933) (discussing the separation of ownership and control as the basis for corporate
governance); Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 479 (exploring how Distributed Business Entities could
return corporate governance to a pre-Berle-Means world).
243. RIPKEN, supra note 129, at 29 (describing the origin of the aggregate theory as the shift in
incorporation laws around 1916 which enabled the formation of small- and medium-sized
corporations, explaining “[b]ecause general incorporation laws allowed anyone easily to incorporate
a business without the heavy state scrutiny that had previously existed, the focus shifted from the state
as the authority and originator of the corporation to the human individuals who incorporated the
business for profit.”). Ripken notes that “[t]he aggregate theory, also called the contractual or
associational theory, is rooted in the right of individuals to associate with one another, to form
voluntary groups, to strike mutually beneficial bargains, and to otherwise freely relate to each other
in ways that fulfill their own private interests.” Id. at 31.
244. Id. at 33 (“As the size of the corporation grows, the aggregate theory loses some of its
practicability . . . .”). Indeed, as the separation between ownership by larger and larger numbers of
passive investors and a small number of active managers increased in the early twentieth century, it
became apparent that “the aggregate theory was not an entirely satisfactory description of the
corporate person, [such that] a new theory, the real entity theory, emerged to explain the personhood
of the corporation.” Id. at 33–34.
245. Id. at 32 (“[T]he corporation must be entitled to the same constitutional protection that its
human members would have if acting in their individual capacity. . . . From this perspective, the law
must uphold corporate rights to protect the rights of the natural persons behind the corporation.”).
246. Id. at 35 (“Although corporate legal personality can be regarded as a fiction, the entity that is
personified is certainly not fictional. It is a full-fledged, actual reality that exists as an objective fact
and has a real presence in society.”).
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change corporate governance structures,247 if formed as corporations,248
such use of AI systems does not change the corporate status as a separate
entity.249 Finally, the hybrid social persons of Autonomous Entity
corporations, with no humans to control or even own the corporation,
represent a very literal embodiment of an artificial entity.250
Table 4: Linking Multiple Theories of Personhood to the
ABR Taxonomy
Traditional Plus

Distributed Business
Entities

Autonomous Entities

Property

Substitute or Conduit for
Humans

Hybrid Social Person

Real & Artificial Entity Theories

Aggregate & Real Entity
Theories

Artificial Entity Theory

1

2

3

4

5

6

Primarily
Operationally
Automated

Managerial
Automation
Light

Autonomous
Mediating
Hierarchy

Mostly
Autonomous

Fully
Autonomous

Algorithmic
Entities

Why do the linkages between the theories matter? Around the world,
lawmakers251 and civil society groups252 are considering how to enable
247. Reyes, ABR, supra note 20, at 478–80.
248. LoPucki, supra note 21, 898–99 (explaining how to form autonomous corporations).
249. RIPKEN, supra note 129, at 35; KENT GREENFIELD, CORPORATIONS ARE PEOPLE TOO (AND
THEY SHOULD ACT LIKE IT) 2 (2018) (“[C]orporations have been, are, and should be legal persons.
They are separate entities with a set of individual capacities, limitations, rights, and obligations that
are distinct from those who work for them or invest in them. Corporations are independent legal
personalities and can sue, be sued, enter into contracts, own property, buy stuff, and sell stuff—all in
their own name and legal capacity.”).
250. RIPKEN, supra note 129, at 25 (“This framework for corporate enterprise was consistent with
the belief that incorporation was a unique privilege or concession awarded by the state. The
corporation was viewed as a creature of law, possessing only the rights and duties that the law allowed
it to have.”).
251. See, e.g., PARLIAMENT OF MALTA, ACT NO. XXXIII OF 2018 (July 20, 2018),
https://parlament.mt/media/95214/act-xxxiii-innovative-technology-arrangements-and-servicesact.pdf [https://perma.cc/9LFB-4ZYY] (creating a path for formalizing autonomous businesses and
enabling legal personality); H.B. 21LSO-0263 Working Draft 0.5, 2021 Leg. (Wyo. 2021),
https://wyoleg.gov/InterimCommittee/2020/S19-2020121621LSO-0263v0.5.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HT3D-EBHG] (proposing amendments, which were mostly later adopted, to the
Wyoming LLC Act to accommodate DAOs).
252. See, e.g., Coal. of Automated Legal Applications, The DAO Model Law, MEDIUM (Dec. 18,
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increasingly autonomous corporations to interact with the world. In light
of the technology, some of the discussion considers whether business
organization laws can and should be changed to account for the fact that
the technology that enables autonomous corporations endogenously
fulfills some of the functions of the law.253 As lawmakers and legal reform
groups consider the extent to which that is true, and whether and how it
should impact their approach to autonomous corporations, the links
between AI personhood and corporate personhood theories in the
autonomous corporate personhood context offer a framework within
which to make such decisions.
When Traditional Plus corporations can be linked to both an AI
personhood view of AI systems as property and a corporate personhood
view of corporations as both real and artificial entities, the socio-legal
needs of a system accommodating such entities becomes clear. Namely,
the AI personhood theory—the AI system merely constitutes property of
the Traditional Plus corporation—gives way to the socio-legal needs
represented by the real and artificial entity theories: legal convenience and
protecting other natural and legal persons with whom the corporation
interacts. In other words, for Traditional Plus corporations, not much
needs to change in the way the law determines the nature and scope of
corporate personhood.
Of course, this Article passes no judgment on whether the current
theories of corporate personhood and how the Supreme Court chooses to
apply them make any sense. As discussed at length above, a rich and vast
literature addressing that issue already exists.254 The point here is much
simpler: whatever form of personhood corporations enjoy, Traditional
Plus corporations also enjoy regardless of its ownership and use of
autonomous technology. The presence of an AI system in Traditional Plus
corporations does not really change the basic nature and structure of the
corporation itself, just the way the corporation finds business efficiencies
in the pursuit of profit.255 Currently, corporations enjoy only the benefits
of personhood granted to them by statute and Supreme Court

2019), https://medium.com/coala/the-dao-model-law-68e5360971ea [https://perma.cc/E4ZWECG9] (proposing a model law for enabling the legal recognition of DAOs).
253. Rodrigues, supra note 225, at 714; Reyes, Rockefeller, supra note 21, at 377–78.
254. See supra section III.A.
255. If changes in the way corporations conduct their affairs changes the ability of laws to hold
corporations accountable, other legal doctrines may need to be adjusted for Traditional Plus
corporations, even if the doctrine of corporate personhood is not. See generally, e.g., Diamantis, supra
note 142 (proposing changes in corporate criminal law to account for extensive reliance by what I call
Traditional Plus corporations on AI to make decisions).
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jurisprudence.256 Corporations, in other words, do not enjoy the full
spectrum of rights enjoyed by humans.257 Given these restrictions,
traditional corporate personhood theories, equally applicable to
Traditional Plus corporations, might be thought of as a type of slightly
“Restricted Personhood.”258
Distributed Business Entities, on the other hand, can be linked to both
an AI personhood view of AI systems as conduits for collective human
activity, and to corporate personhood theories of corporations as both
aggregations of natural persons and real entities in their own right. These
theories together reveal the socio-legal needs of Distributed Business
Entities as preserving the rights of the individual participants in the
corporate whole,259 while also providing a legal fiction that enables the
imposition of responsibilities upon the collective when it acts as a
collective.260 In other words, when a Distributed Business Entity both
fulfills all the formalities of a traditional corporation and yet radically
flattens the ownership and management structure, such corporations
might be entitled to a fuller measure of legal personhood. This form of
“Full Personhood” might actually track more closely to the rights and
responsibilities of natural persons than the Restricted Personhood of their
Traditional Plus counterparts. Given the current critique that corporations
enjoy too many rights already,261 how could the law justify such a notion
of Full Personhood? In the Distributed Business Entity context, the natural
person owners of the corporation participate more directly in the
management of the corporation’s affairs than in the Traditional Plus
corporation context. Thus, where reliance on the rights of the natural
256. Greenfield, supra note 17, at 321–22 (quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819) (“Being the mere creature of law, [the corporation] possesses only those
properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either expressly, or as incidental to its very
existence.”)).
257. Id. at 321 (“Of course corporations are not genuine human beings and should not automatically
receive all the constitutional rights that human beings claim. At the same time, . . . it is similarly
obvious that corporations should be able to claim some constitutional rights.” (emphasis in original)).
258. This may seem counterintuitive to corporate personhood scholars who view the legal
landscape as already too generous in bestowing rights upon corporations. See, e.g., GREENFIELD,
supra note 249, at 81 (“Corporations may be ‘people’ but not in ways that matter for every right. They
should be able to claim the rights essential to keep the government in check or those necessary for
companies to fulfill their institutional role of building wealth in the marketplace. They should not be
able to claim rights based on human characteristics or rights that, if asserted, would undermine the
operation of the marketplace.”). However, the term Restricted Personhood remains representational
of the theories underlying corporate personhood and the socio-legal needs that they meet.
259. RIPKEN, supra note 129, at 32.
260. Id. at 35; Greenfield, supra note 17, at 315.
261. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 249, at 81 (arguing that corporations should not receive too
many rights because they currently may claim rights based on human characteristics and not just rights
related to their economic role in society).
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person owners (shareholders) to give Traditional Plus organizations
increasingly faces criticism for lack of actual shareholder involvement,
that critique carries less force in the Distributed Business Entity context.
Indeed, the argument that when natural persons organize form and
together vote and take collective action via the corporate form, the law
should not require such individuals to abdicate their natural rights more
accurately reflects the flatter governance structure of Distributed Business
Entities than it does Traditional Plus corporations.262 Further, the
existence of such corporations may provide an opportunity to truly restrict
the Restricted Personhood enjoyed by Traditional Plus corporations.
Legislatures might, for example, consider requiring corporate governance
changes in order to work higher into the autonomous corporate
personhood spectrum where the corporation enjoys additional rights. In
any case, because natural persons in Distributed Business Entities use AI
systems merely as a conduit for their collective human activity, awarding
a type of Full Personhood to such corporations aligns with both the AI
personhood and corporate personhood literature.
Autonomous Entities, for their part, insofar as they are connected to the
least natural person-like theories in both the AI personhood literature and
the corporate personhood literature, should ostensibly receive very little
by way of the rights of natural persons. The law might offer to
Autonomous Entities a type of “Limited Personhood.” Such a Limited
Personhood might imbue Autonomous Entities with just enough
recognition as a legal person to protect natural persons from Autonomous
Entities, and, inversely, to protect natural persons from abusing the
Autonomous Entity form. In other words, Limited Personhood would use
the personhood fiction to create a liability structure to enable
accountability for Autonomous Entities. For example, if an Autonomous
Entity creates widgets that injure consumers, Limited Personhood would
provide the legal fiction that enables the Autonomous Entity to be sued
and held accountable. And inversely, Limited Personhood would place
limits on natural persons’ actions and activities in creating Autonomous
Entities to uphold social values. For example, an Autonomous Entity that
failed to take sufficient steps to abide by the formal requirements of
corporate law might not be viewed as an artificial entity at all, but rather,
the property of the developer or developers that created it. Withholding
any recognition of personhood in such circumstance would discourage
natural persons from trying to use Autonomous Entities as a liability
shield for activity they expect to cause harm.
In sum, and as visually depicted in Table 5 below, an approach to

262. RIPKEN, supra note 129, at 32.
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autonomous corporate personhood that fully accounts for the interacting
system of AI and corporations recognizes both the socio-technical and
socio-legal differences among autonomous corporations and builds a
spectrum of personhood to account for those differences: the
“Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum.” In the Autonomous
Corporate Personhood Spectrum, the most limited form of personhood is
enjoyed by the autonomous corporations least tied to humans while the
fullest form of personhood is reserved for the autonomous corporation that
genuinely serves as a conduit for collective activity by natural persons.
The version of restricted corporate personhood that society has in mind
when they think of corporations sits somewhere in the middle. The
Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum demonstrates, at least for
autonomous corporations, that other categories of personhood exist
beyond the traditional corporate personhood doctrine applicable to
Traditional Plus corporations, which, in turn, suggests a window for legal
reform, particularly as autonomous corporations become more prevalent
in society.
Table 5: The Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum
Traditional Plus

Distributed Business
Entities

Autonomous Entities

Restricted Personhood

Full Personhood

Limited Personhood

1

2

3

4

5

6

Primarily
Operationally
Automated

Managerial
Automation
Light

Autonomous
Mediating
Hierarchy

Mostly
Autonomous

Fully
Autonomous

Algorithmic
Entities

B.

Implications of the Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum
for the Intersection of Law and AI Systems

Up to this point, this Article sought to offer insight into the implications
of AI personhood theory and corporate personhood theory for the rights
of a specific type of artificial system: autonomous corporations. This
Article now turns the inquiry around,263 asking whether the Autonomous

263. This approach reflects a deeply held view that inquiries at the intersection of law and
technology are rarely only one-way endeavors. Rather, “the relationship between law and code is a
fluid, multidirectional relationship. The emergence of new computer-code structures may influence

Reyes (Do Not Delete)

1506

12/14/2021 10:00 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 96:1453

Corporate Personhood Spectrum and the process of reaching it might
teach lessons about how to approach the intersection of law and AI
systems more broadly. The first lesson, simply put, is that there may not
always be one theory to rule them all. Rather, when considering the nature
and scope of legal rules for AI systems, context should play a significant
role in defining the appropriate bundles of rights and duties that attach.
Further, any such consideration of context will likely require an inquiry
into both the socio-technical reality of the AI system and the socio-legal
reality of the use to which the AI system is put.
The process of creating the Autonomous Corporate Personhood
Spectrum demonstrates this quite well. Prior to consideration of context,
scholars considering the possibility of autonomous businesses as
corporations and other legal entities assumed that traditional corporate
personhood should apply.264 However, considering the socio-technical
context of the AI system within the corporate form—whether it was
property, a conduit for human activity, or the corporation itself—
demonstrated that neither the AI personhood theories nor the corporate
personhood theories support such uniform application of corporate
personhood doctrine to autonomous corporations. Rather, the socio-legal
needs of the corporate personhood doctrine demand a fuller spectrum to
appropriately deal with the wide variety of autonomous corporations the
technology makes possible.
The lesson, then, is that without deeper investigation into both the
reality of the technology and the legal demands of the social context in
which the technology will be used, legal rules will continue
generalizations, and perhaps worse, perpetuate myths, to the detriment of
both industry and consumers. Such generalizations may lead the legal
community to dismiss societal pressure for legal change, as when the
corporate personhood doctrine downplayed the Personless Corporation as
implausible because the legal community views autonomous corporations
as just one thing. Alternatively, such generalizations may properly
identify problems but lead to overly burdensome legal regimes that stifle
innovation.265
the trajectory of the law, but the law also influences the trajectory of the code.” Reyes, Rockefeller,
supra note 21, at 429.
264. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 21, at 890–91 (listing a variety of constitutional rights
Algorithmic Entities would enjoy as corporations because of corporate personhood); Bayern, Of
Bitcoins, supra note 22, at 1497 (noting that wrapping AI in an entity wrapper would give it legal
personality).
265. See, e.g., Carla L. Reyes, Moving Beyond Bitcoin to an Endogenous Theory of Decentralized
Ledger Technology Regulation: An Initial Proposal, 61 VILL. L. REV. 191, 194 (2016) [hereinafter
Beyond Bitcoin] (arguing that early regulatory efforts that viewed blockchain technology solely as a
payments system threatened innovation in other use cases of the technology).
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For anyone involved in legal reform or law-making, this first lesson
begs an important question: how can the law take context into account
while still upholding the time-honored principle of technology
neutrality?266 The answer to this question holds the second lesson of the
Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum for the interaction of law
and AI systems more broadly. Namely, at the core of this Article’s
argument about the importance of socio-technical and socio-legal context
for creating legal rules at the intersection of law and technology sits an
understanding of technological neutrality that does not demand
uniformity. Too often, the legal community uses the call for technology
neutrality to hide behind the difficult work of actually understanding the
technology.267 Doing so often leads lawmakers and regulators to create
rules for problems that do not exist268 or to combat real problems in overly
invasive or overly burdensome ways.269 If the Autonomous Corporate
Personhood Spectrum teaches us anything about the intersection of law
and technology, it is that the law cannot use the maxim of technology
neutrality to hide behind failure to understand technology.
This is not to say that this Article favors calling out or defining specific
technology in laws and regulations.270 Defining specific technology
causes problems in its own right.271 Rather, this Article contends that
266. See, e.g., Chris Reed, Taking Sides on Technology Neutrality, 4 SCRIPT-ED 263, 264 (2007)
(“Technology neutrality has long been held up as a guiding principle for the proper regulation of
technology, particularly the information and communications technologies.”); U.N. COMM’N ON
INT’L TRADE, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT,
at 17, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.4 (1996), https://uncitral.un.org/sites/uncitral.un.org/files/mediadocuments/uncitral/en/19-04970_ebook.pdf [https://perma.cc/HT64-4UJ3] (“The objectives of the
Model law, which include enabling or facilitating the use of electronic commerce and providing equal
treatment to users of paper-based documentation and to users of computer-based information, are
essential for fostering economy and efficiency in international trade. By incorporating the procedures
prescribed in the Model Law in its national legislation for those situations where parties opt to use
electronic means of communication, an enacting State would create a media-neutral environment.”);
see also id. at 23–24 (“It was felt during the preparation of the Model Law that exclusion of any form
or medium by way of a limitation in the scope of the Model Law might result in practical difficulties
and would run counter to the purpose of providing truly ‘media-neutral’ rules.”); Bert-Jaap Koops,
Should ICT Regulation Be Technology-Neutral?, in 9 STARTING POINTS FOR ICT REGULATION:
DECONSTRUCTING PREVALENT POLICY ONE-LINERS 77 (Bert-Jaap Koops, Miriam Lips, Corien Prins
& Maurice Schellekens eds., 2006) (evaluating the extent to which the maxim of technology neutrality
had its intended effects in the context of ICT regulation).
267. Reed, supra note 266, at 266–67.
268. See LoPucki, supra note 21, at 897, 947–48.
269. Reyes, Beyond Bitcoin, supra note 265, at 212.
270. In fact, I argue against doing so in other work. See Carla L Reyes, A Unified Theory of CodeConnected Contracts, 46 J. CORP. L. 981 (2021).
271. See, e.g., id. at 991–97 (offering a functional understanding of the term “smart contracts” and
explaining how failure to use a functional approach led to misunderstandings between the legal
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technology neutrality, correctly understood, uses functional equivalence
to allow law to describe activity.272 That activity can then be achieved in
any number of ways, with or without the use of technology.273 However,
to adequately describe the functional equivalents of new activities enabled
by technology, legal reformers must first understand what is
technologically possible to achieve, and what is not,274 and why
developers seek to achieve such activity with particular tools, or not.275 In
doing so, lawmakers may find, as the Autonomous Corporate Personhood
Spectrum demonstrates, that the wording and content of legal rules may
need to vary in order to achieve the desired technologically neutral
effects.276 The lesson of autonomous corporate personhood for technology
neutrality, then, is to let the socio-legal needs of the full technological
system (the AI and its contextual components) drive the lawmaking
process,277 and then to find the words that make the effects of regulation
functionally equivalent for the same activity regardless of the medium
through which the activity is conducted.
The third lesson that the Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum
offers for inquiries at the intersection of law and AI systems emphasizes
that the use of technology, right down to the gritty details, matters for legal
analysis, not the level of automation enabled by that technology.278
Admittedly, this third lesson is intimately tied to the second lesson
regarding the importance of functionally equivalent descriptions of
activity in law, rather than attempts to define particular technologies.
However, the lesson stands on its own because it takes us back to the
industry and the blockchain industry); Angela Walch, The Path of the Blockchain Lexicon (and the
Law), 36 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 713, 730–31 (2017) (examining the challenges created by defining
specific technology, particularly emerging technology for which terminology remains in flux).
272. Reed, supra note 266, at 268 (identifying regulation of activities and functional equivalence
as two meanings of technology neutrality).
273. Koops, supra note 266, at 82 (“In general, regulation aims at regulating people’s behavior. It
does not regulate the behavior of machines, except to the extent that machine behavior influences
people’s behavior. Moreover, behavior as such is not the point of regulation, it is rather the effect of
behavior on society or on other people that is the focus of the regulation.”).
274. Reed, supra note 266, at 272 (“It is worth noting that the extent of neutrality as between
different technology implementations depends very much on the definition of the technology to be
regulated.”).
275. Id. at 274–75.
276. Id. at 267 (“We need therefore to recognise that technologically neutral rules addressing the
same issue may well differ in their wording and content, in order to achieve the same (or at least
broadly equivalent) effects when applied to these technologies.” (emphasis in original)).
277. Id. at 268.
278. Indeed, this is a lesson of the ABR Taxonomy, standing alone, for those considering the
intersection of law and autonomous businesses: the mere fact of automation does not make
autonomous businesses exceptional to the level of requiring new business organizational law. Reyes,
ABR, supra note 20, at 437.
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beginning. The legal community must take the time necessary to
understand the relevant technologies for which they craft law or to which
they apply the law for clients.279 Despite the definitional difficulties in the
field, the legal community must look beyond labels like “emerging
technologies,” “automation,” and “artificial intelligence” to truly
understand whether and how use of the technology impacts analysis under
existing technology neutral laws or genuinely poses questions requiring
the development of new legal principles.
CONCLUSION
This Article built an approach to legal personhood for autonomous
corporations that accounts for their full systems nature: part-AI system
and part-corporation. To do so, this Article considered the existing AI
personhood and corporate personhood literatures, applying them to the
socio-technical reality of autonomous businesses. This approach revealed
three core socio-legal needs of autonomous corporate personhood:
protecting the rights of individual natural people that created the
corporation, upholding social values even when allowing autonomous
corporations to interact with society, and creating a fiction of personhood
for legal convenience in devising corporate accountability structures.
Further, the process of identifying these socio-legal needs underscored the
importance of the socio-technical context of AI systems to crafting
appropriate legal rules. Rather than interfere with law’s emphasis on
technology neutrality, tying rules for autonomous corporate personhood
to different socio-technical contexts enables functionally equivalent legal
rules and avoids burdensome regulation (and regulation of non-existent
problems).
Ultimately, this Article offers the Autonomous Corporate Personhood
Spectrum for use by the lawmakers and legal reformers considering how
to determine the nature and scope of artificial personhood for autonomous
businesses. The Autonomous Corporate Personhood Spectrum, for its
part, counsels those lawmakers and legal reformers to keep open the
possibility that a system of rules might be needed, rather than one single
approach to rule them all. The argument that law must account for the
socio-technical context and socio-legal needs of AI systems also,
however, raises significant legal issues to be explored in future work. For
example, there may be possible links between corporate governance
structures and a more robust bundle of rights attendant to corporate
279. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct now recognize a duty of technological competence.
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT, r. 1.1 cmt. 8 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). The duty should apply with
equal force to those shaping the law as to those applying it in a client context.
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personhood. In other words, perhaps, autonomous corporations offer
lawmakers the opportunity to experiment with incentivizing certain
corporate governance reforms using more robust forms of corporate
personhood as a carrot. However, significant questions remain as to
whether or how lawmakers could adopt such incentivization schemes, or
whether doing so would withstand a legal challenge under current
Supreme Court corporate personhood decisions.
Finally, the lessons of autonomous corporate personhood drive home
the multi-dimensional relationship between law and technology. To fully
appreciate the effect that new legal rules may have on technology and its
role in society, the legal community must develop a deeper understanding
of the computational processes that power the technology. Meanwhile, the
legal community cannot lose sight of the context in which those
computational processes operate. The law may need to rely on its own
systems nature to properly provide the relevant structure for the
interaction of technology and society that will continue to uphold
important societal values. As this investigation into autonomous corporate
personhood shows, doing so requires significantly deeper
interdisciplinarity than the law as an academic discipline typically
embraces, and may push lawyers to reduce silos in practice.

